RUSSIAN WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE
№ 43 OCTOBER 1992

NEW TIMES

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INTERNATIONAL

SERGEI STANKEVICH

A first-wave democrat looking for a second chance

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

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

Even when they sat side by side, they were miles apart

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

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Drawing by Alexander Zudin

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An example not worth following

A "dissident" radio station broadcasting programmes to Vietnam is beginning to operate in Russia. I think it is both immoral and impractical. Why should we complicate relations with a major Asian country? We have built up lively trade over the years.

"Dissident" broadcasting is immoral because, by supporting and financing the anti-government radio station, we are again teaching Vietnam how to live and are again imposing our example on it. Our example of a transition from a totalitarian regime to democracy, however, can hardly be called smooth. Too much blood has been shed. The economy is in the doldrums, culture and science are declining, crime is growing, and mass unemployment is expected. If we are going to beam programmes to Vietnam we had better inform our listeners of the whole truth. In such a case I think our example won't seem very attractive to the Vietnamese.

Academician A.Y. Shilov,
Moscow Region

Mysterious coincidence

The mystery over the Korean airliner KAL-007 shot down on September 1, 1983, continues to concern world opinion and engenders numerous conjectures. But for some reason two amazing facts are ignored by everyone. Flight number 007 coincides with the number of James Bond. The KAL-007 belonged to Korean Airlines, which also owned the passenger airliner downed by Soviet fighters in April 1978.

The political upshot of the first incident was insignificant, while the second incident had worldwide repercussions. The Soviet system was exposed to shame at the UN General Assembly in 1983. The US Congress approved an unprecedented military budget. As a result, Gorbachev came to power. He initiated *perestroika* which ended in the abolition of world socialism and the breakdown of the Soviet Union.

R. Khrapko

The role of Cossacks

Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi once said that Russia could not be revived without Cossacks. A highly doubtful statement. Cossacks are not a nation. They enjoyed special privileges for their constant readiness to give up their lives for the Tsar and the homeland. The artificially created military-police structure defended the interests of tsarist autocracy and kept the population of neighbouring regions in fear. It was Cossacks with sabres and whips who captured the Urals and Siberia, while Ivan the Terrible with his guns could reach only Kazan.

The present Cossack chieftains seek spiritual support in the former party *apparatchiks*, but Soviet Cossacks have yet to learn the history of the Bolsheviks. The Communist Party was the only one in the world which annihilated its own allies when there was no longer need for them. The present Communists, if they come to power, will crush the self-styled horseless Cossacks in one stroke.

Lukman Zakirov
Kazan

Revelations of a voluntary agent

I am an agent of the State Security Service and have no reason to repent. I am proud that I cooperate with this service, and not for thirty silver coins. In the past I received a grant of 100 rubles every six months. At present I do not take money in general. I stand on my own feet. I am able to think for myself and am clever with my hands. For instance, "they" did not help me find work as a plumber. I continue to cooperate with the State Security simply because I am an honest citizen of my country no matter how it is called – the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation. If there is a country, there is also a state, that is, national interests and state security which must rely on honest citizens. Someone must be a sanitation man no matter how shocking the term may seem to some people. I have worked and will continue to work for the committee in the name of free Russia.

I am writing this letter under a pseudonym and sending it from another town. Conspiration is necessary under democracy too.

Felix
Perm

Information from "other sources"

Regarding Marina Shakina's article "He prefers to stay in the background" (No. 34/92). Yuri Skokov, Secretary of the Security Council, refused to speak about himself and the author therefore obtained information about his background from "other sources." What sources and what kind of information did she get?

Personally I consider Yuri Skokov a courageous Communist who is not capable of treachery or other immoral and mean actions. The journalist evidently wanted to undermine confidence in Skokov and drive a wedge between decent people who surround the Russian President. As for her irony concerning "the profound modern concept of the security of Russia," perhaps Shakina, a journalist of the "independent press," will give the President her cue on how to act.

A regular reader
Bishkek

THE WAY I SEE IT



Drawing by Alexander Zudin

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Yeltsin-Gorbachev: antipathy still causing damage to Russia

It's rumoured that in October 1991, when it was clear that Gorbachev's leadership was coming to an end, Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the US President for Press Relations, who was in the USSR at the time, asked his Russian colleague Pavel Voshchanov to inform Boris Yeltsin that George Bush was hurt by the insolent and offensive tone assumed by some newspapers with regard to Mikhail Gorbachev and that he would appreciate Yeltsin's statement to this effect. Boris Yeltsin seemed ready to publicly denounce the outrages by journalists but, as soon as he came across Mikhail Gorbachev's interview in which he expressed his intention to remain the country's leader, Yeltsin evidently thought better of it and astonished the Americans at the nearest press conference, having made his own contribution to the anti-Gorbachev campaign. The "grave-digger of communism" is intolerable of the resisting and clinging to power and influence "father of *perestroika*."

The situation repeats one year later, this time assuming a much less innocent form. As soon as Mikhail Gorbachev started reanimating himself as a political figure (a hopeless affair in the opinion of even the ex-President's comrades-in-arms), rebukes were hurled on him, some of it rather dubious from the legal point of view. The Foundation headed by him was deprived of its premises, except 1,000 sq. metres of offices, granted it by President Boris Yeltsin's decree a year ago, and the Foundation Chairman's freedom of travelling outside Russia was limited. The pro-government press expresses doubts about the ex-President's political and personal honesty. His successor in the Kremlin whips up passions of criticism, repeatedly affirming that the ex-President has set an example of flouting civic duty by ignoring a summons to the Constitutional Court. At the Court itself, where the investigation is under way into the constitutionality of President Yeltsin's decrees banning the CPSU, the side representing his interests files documents persuing only one aim – to blame all crimes of the totalitarian regime on Gorbachev and to portray him as an inveterate liar.

Leaving aside the question of whether or not these accusations are justified, let's examine their consequences for the person making them and for Russia as a whole. The extremes Boris Yeltsin goes to make even his supporters defend Mikhail Gorbachev. Last week's statements in favour of Gorbachev were made both in Parliament and in the press. This means that one more "point of tension" has broken out in the ruling coalition, at a moment when unity of all politically productive forces is necessary in order to overcome the present crisis. The President must bear in mind that the multiparty bloc Civil Alliance, to which he is going to entrust the burden of governmental functions and which resists the initiative in favour of his impeachment in parliament, doesn't approve of his anti-Gorbachev campaign either.

But it's abroad that Boris Yeltsin is going to reap the most bitter fruits. Clamping down against the ex-President has caused a much more harsh and negative reaction in the West than even George Bush expressed last October. Gorbachev was invited to France as soon as the news of restrictions imposed on his travels abroad reached the West. It is expected that the stream of official invitations won't stop but will only pick up, especially while Boris Yeltsin seems to be teasing the West with his new ill-thought out steps.

Especially shocking was the démarche with the forming of a Russian delegation to Willi Brandt's funeral. Chancellor Helmut Kohl personally invited Mikhail Gorbachev, and the Russian side wisely decided to put no obstacles for the ex-President. However, this act of prudence was followed by what was considered in Germany as an act of blatant disregard for the memory of the outstanding German politician, the present German leadership and the leaders of many countries who gathered for the mourning ceremony in Berlin. At the last moment Yeltsin decided to send State Secretary Gennady Burbulis there, instead of Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi. The former's influence on Russian policies still seems great. However, his official status as the President's first adjutant and "special task" trouble shooter is too low for such an occasion, and this was regarded by the German side precisely as "vengeance" for inviting Mikhail Gorbachev.

Those well-versed in Kremlin mysteries are confident that our country could have avoided many troubles if not for the personal feud between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. A different result, in particular, might have come about with the Union Treaty, as well as with many other matters. The list of troubles, however, which this contention will cost the nation, seems yet to be exhausted.

Vladimir Kulistikov

THIS WEEK

■ The Russian parliament refused to put off the Congress of People's Deputies from December to next spring. With his request denied, President Yeltsin took another step. A working summit meeting of the constituent republics of the Russian Federation was urgently convened. Opening the meeting, Yeltsin said there was the pressing need to establish a council made up of leaders of the republics. In his opinion, the new body should promote the unity of Russia and harmonize interaction between federate and local authorities. The President spoke in favour of delegating more powers to the republics, "perhaps even more than it is stipulated for in the Federal Treaty."

Yeltsin's initiative was approved and a decision was adopted to a form a council of republican leaders. Boris Yeltsin became Chairman of the new body and Security Council Secretary Yuri Skokov was appointed Secretary of its working group.

The heads of the republics asked the parliament again to consider the question of postponing the Congress of People's Deputies so that a final draft of the Russian Federation's new Constitution could be adopted at it. However, this appeal was also rejected by the parliament.

■ The sending of more troops to protect military depots and auxiliary premises and the agreements reached in Bishkek helped to stabilize, to a certain extent, the situation in Tajikistan. However, this met with resistance on the part of the opposition. Provocative leaflets are once again being distributed in Tajikistan. The headquarters of opposition forces call on their militants to move to Dushanbe and engage in combat when it becomes necessary. It also advises them to regard as hostages Russian-speaking citizens of the Kulyab and Leninabad regions and all opponents of the opposition.

The "masters" of today's Tajikistan are people with the weapons in their hands

Col.Gen. Vorobyov, Deputy Commander of land forces, managed to reach a ceasefire agreement between the fighting parties in Kulyaby and Kurgan-Tyube, which was soon, however, to be violated. Oil to the fire is added by Afghan mujaheddin who supply one of the opposed parties, the Islamic Party of Revival, with Israeli and Chinese grenade launchers and American Stingers.

■ The days of commemoration of Saint Sergi of Radonezh, timed to the 600th anniversary of his death, were marked by many significant events. One of them was the exhibition still open in Moscow. It was opened by Alexy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. He noted the great role of St. Sergi of Radonezh, founder of the Troitse-Sergiyev monastery, who during an hour of trial for Russia supported the unification of Russian territories and became a spiritual enlightener of the people.

We recover spiritual values in different ways, including the sharing of sacred values

Over 400 ancient Russian paintings, articles of applied arts, manuscripts and ancient book are on display at the exhibition. These treasures were given for display purposes by more than 30 museums, archives and libraries of Russia.

■ The results of elections to the Georgian parliament have been made public. The largest number of seats was won by the Peace bloc. It is followed by the October 11 and Unity blocs, the Green Party, the National Democratic Party, and the Traditionalists. Among the newly elected deputies are premier Tenghiz Sigua, defence minister Tenghiz Kitovani, many former Communist officials, including former Communist Party leader Dzhumber Patiashvili, who was considered responsible for the April 9, 1989, tragedy.

■ The situation in Abkhazia after the elections remains relatively calm. Many explain this by the visit of a UN mission to the region. The Georgian public attaches great importance to this visit held on Eduard Shevardnadze's initiative. The mission is headed by Antoine Blanca, assistant of the UN Secretary-General. In Sukhumi, Antonio Blanca met with the Georgian leader of Abkhazia and in Gudauta he talked with Ardzinba, Chairman of the Abkhazian parliament, who set forth his approach to the question of ending hostilities.

After this talk Antoine Blanca said there was little chance of the two parties reaching agreement because the Abkhazian leader has his own interpretation of the agreement reached in Moscow on September 3. Blanca told journalists that upon arrival in New York he would raise the question of sending a UN peace-keeping force to Abkhazia.

■ The Russian government has made a statement in connection with the armed conflict in Abkhazia. It says that Russia cannot remain indifferent to the misfortune of neighbouring peoples. The armed conflict, fraught with a real danger of spreading to Russia, also affects the vital interests of the entire region.

The government of the Russian Federation calls for an immediate, complete and unconditional ceasefire in the conflict area and for the complete fulfilment by the parties concerned of their commitments made in the September 3 agreement.

■ The first official visit to Moscow by Abulfaz Elchibei as President of Azerbaijan is a clear landmark in the development of Russian-Azerbaijanian relations. A treaty on economic cooperation

and security was signed. The parties agreed on guarantees for joint security and immediately to begin negotiations in the event of a threat to them. The treaty also defines prospects for cooperation in the Caspian Sea area. It contains a separate provision on the border between the two states. Only custom services are to be set on the border. The parties considered the "fate" of the two national currencies: the ruble and the Azerbaijanian manat. The presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan gave a high assessment to the treaty, expressing confidence that the parliament will approve it without delay.

At a press conference Abulfaz Elchibei reaffirmed his adherence to bilateral treaties because, in his opinion, the Commonwealth of Independent States has no future.

■ Leonid Kuchma, head of the large space missile concern Yuzhmash in Dnepropetrovsk, has become a new Premier of Ukraine, the third in the last three years. But the election of a new premier did nothing to solve the political and economic situation in that nation. The opposition was only able to depose Vitold Fokin. However, it proved unable to get its radical candidate elected to the post of premier. Precisely this circumstance enabled "a general of the military-industrial complex" little known in the political sphere to become head of the Ukrainian government. Kuchma and his team are believed to hold the same orientation as Arkady Volsky. The new Premier has already shown himself as a skilful diplomat and politician. Kuchma made it clear that he is against "shock therapy" and the privatization of large enterprises. Nevertheless, many serious analysts consider appointment of Kuchma as merely half a step, but half a step forward.

■ Rudolf Pikhoya, Chairman of the Committee for Archives under the Russian government, flew to Warsaw as President Yeltsin's special envoy to present Lech Valesa with documents from the special department of the top-level archives of the Communist Party's central committee.

The documents contain irrefutable proof showing that the top leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union directly organized the execution of 14,700 former officers of the Polish army captured by the Red Army and several thousand Poles kept in Soviet camps. According to President Yeltsin's press secretary V. Kostikov, the documents handed to President Valesa show that the Communist Party leaders, from Stalin to Gorbachev, knew the truth about the shooting of Poles in Katyn and other places but deliberately kept the truth from their own people and world opinion.

■ The penetration of sea-going vessels of the international independent ecological organization Greenpeace into the territorial waters of Russia has caused an uproar. The ecological vessel *Solo* was detained by Russian frontier guards 20 miles from Novaya Zemlya. In Archangelsk, the mayor of the city, officially annulled his invitation to *Solo* to visit this port in the north of Russia. It is possible that the members of Greenpeace's expedition will be put on trial.

In waging the battle against pollution, it doesn't pay to break federal laws. Otherwise it may cause troubles, as shown by Greenpeace experience

CARTOON OF THE WEEK



Drawing by Vladimir Mochalov

■ Almost ten years after a night attack by Soviet interceptor-fighter, which destroyed up the South Korean plane with 269 passengers on board, the veil of secrecy over this tragedy has been lifted.

A delegation from the Republic of Korea and representatives of the US-based association of relatives of victims of the KAL-007 disaster were presented by President Yeltsin with 12 documents concerning the circumstances of that tragedy.

Quotations of the week

"Our aim is to build a strong Russian state, strong not by the number of warheads but in advanced technologies, with modern and diversified economy, and decent living standards for the people.

"I can't agree with allegations that present-day Russia is a land of shere materialism. The people of Russia have had and will have great moral values."

Boris Yeltsin,
President of Russia

"We have a fine government, and its programme is being successfully carried out. The issue is, however, that the aim of this programme is to make a mess of our economy."

Yuri Sidorenko,
member of the Russian parliament

"We have had and will have censorship. We have opened and will open letters. We have read and will read them. We have withdrawn and will withdraw them."

Y.V.Morozov,
Deputy Head of the St. Petersburg Custom House
October 1992

"Will sell armoured carrier, buy house in Russia."

Tajiks against Tajiks, clans against clans, Islamists against Communists. As always Russian troops are between hammer and anvil

Our MI-8 chopper circled above virtually the entire Vakhsh Valley. Below we spotted here and there smoke billowing up from burning village huts. Now and again our pilot, who had spent five years in Afghanistan, where incidentally our helicopter had also served, executed several dizzying manoeuvres. The general with us explained that fighting was proceeding down below and that one of the sides might think we were flying help to the other, in which case they would fire at us.

Down below were lovely mountains through which the Vakhsh River meandered plus the Nurek power plant dam, which, if dynamited, would generate a catastrophe of unbelievable proportions. Then, were the nitrogen fertilizer complex sabotaged, that would threaten the region with an ecological calamity.

In the meantime winter is awaited with apprehension. To all practical intents the cotton has not been taken in, though by this time it had usually been as a rule. This year though cotton-picking had yet to begin. Fuel and food have to be freighted into the Badakshan Highlands, but the mountain passes will soon close. However, nobody there seems to care an iota, as a war is in process, and the locals seem still not tired of killing one another.

No front line

Nowadays nobody can tally the toll of life the war has taken. After all, neither belligerent has such statistics available, and indeed couldn't care less. However, it is definitely in the neighbourhood of thousands of lives. No official news conferences are given and the chieftains of the gunmen have no press services. Nor is there a front line. Thus Yevgeny Merkulov, the CO of the Kurgan-Tyube Russian regiment reported to General Sokolov, second in command of Russian ground forces: "Yesterday and last night there was gunfire in such and such an area. A bridge was blown up. Movement of ground groups was noted here and there and also of a tank, while in such and such a district a powerful explosion took place."

Tajikistan's war is totally unlike any of the other conflicts smouldering on the ex-USSR's fringes, from the angle either of features or initial causes. Thus, Savik Shuster, the *Radio Liberty* reporter who covered the fighting in Nicaragua, Chad, Libya and Afghanistan, told me he had never seen anything of the sort anywhere else. The ungovernable character of the gunmen, the irresponsible perfidious nature of their field commanders and the multiplicity of groupings generates chaos, club law and incredible cruelty.

Tajiks are fighting Tajiks, clans are fighting clans, the beggars who never enjoyed power are fighting against those who have lost it, while those who seek to abide by the laws of an Islamic state are fighting those who find the laws of the socialist state more comprehensible and customary.

That the Kurgan-Tyube Region became the epicentre of civil war was not fortuitous, as it is there that all the contradictions of Tajikistan's clan confrontation are concentrated.

In a historical notice the newspaper *The Voice of Tajikistan,* the one-time mouthpiece of the local Communist Party, noted: "From the 1930s the region was deliberately populated with representatives of the Soviet Union's ethnic units deported to this place from all the Union republics, with the repressed, the dispossessed *kulaks,* as well as a legion of semi-starving volunteers."

The "great era of socialism" dawned in the Vakhsh Valley in the 1930s, when its development commenced. The labour armies had to be rigidly disciplined and housed in barracks and, naturally, could not be composed exclusively of Tajik peasants. In the upshot there laboured together Germans, Uzbeks, Russians and Tajiks, the last mostly from the neighbouring Kulyab Region and the Northeastern Garm District.

Tajikistan's best developed part was traditionally the Northern city of Leninabad or Khojend prior to 1936, one of Central

Tajik soldiers during fighting in the Budyonny state farm in Kurgan-Tyube. The war has turned Tajikistan's third largest city into a desperate battleground

Asia's oldest cities. Cencentrated here was 68 percent of the republic's agrarian-industrial complex. All VIP appointments had to be agreed with its leadership.

Hence the erstwhile Communist Party *nomenclatura* is still traditionally strong, while the influence that Islam exerts is negligible. No wonder all coming in from the South to propagate Islam were stoned. Until recently Leninabad oriented on Russia. Rakhmon Nabiev, the President who was deposed in September, hails from Leninabad.

Meanwhile the Garm District was economically backward, while culturally it was influenced by more orthodox Islam. Anyone born in Garm or Kulyab could usually aspire no more than to secondary office in the state machinery.

Old-time recidivist

The return of Nabiev, former First Secretary of Tajikistan's Communist Party, to politics and his electron as Tajikistan's President spelled escalation for the Leninabad clan. However, Nabiev evidently overestimated his capabilities, as he failed to cope with the drastically aggravated economic problems, especially in the south, in Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube, where unemployment was rife. Nor could he work out a common language with either the democratic or Islamist opposition. Hence, he established personally devoted army.

Thus formed was the so-called presidential battalion under one Sangak Safarov from Kulyab, a man who is almost a legend in the republic nowadays. Everybody says he is a "recidivist with 23 years of crime." Whatever the case, he is unquestionably a noticeable person, which is incidentally characteristic of the situation currently obtaining in the republic.

Faced with the virtually complete collapse of such state structures as the agencies of internal affairs and national security, whom Nabiev did not trust, he "relied on the armed people," who, he thought, would be prepared to defend him. No wonder, armed units began to control the situation in the republic. As a rule, these units are commanded by old-time lags, who have their own idea of power and of how to maintain power. Such men are found on either side.

A local Tajik newsman, who asked me not to mention his name, found in a personally conducted inquiry who actually was the first of the ten spokesmen for the "youth of Dushanbe" who had countersigned Nabiev's forced resignation. He is, one Ismat Khabibulaev, who according to the District Attorney was sentenced to two years in jail for involvement in anti-Armenian pogroms in February 1990. Amnestied but a year later, he is well known in Dushanbe as one of top racketeers.

Mosque in regional executive committee building

Nabiev's resignation has to be endorsed *pro forma* by the republic's parliament, but as the currently acting President and Speaker Akbarsho Iskandarov told me, there is "virtually no hope of convening parliament soon." No wonder, in the present situation the Leninabad and Kulyab MPs, who comprise the majority, will not visit the capital. Which means that the legitimacy of the republic's present leadership under Iskandarov is open to question.

Furthermore, the republic's immediate neighbours view with apprehension the political creed of the new leadership, or rather of the forces behind it. Some note this openly, as, for instance, Uzbek President Islam Karimov who fears the "bestial grimace of fundamentalism," others offer more restrained comment.

Tajikistan's current government includes three men from the Islamic Rebirth Party. One, Dovlat Usmon, who is Vice-Premier, is this party's Deputy Chairman. When I asked him what he thought should be done to bring peace, this taciturn man said it was essential to reinforce the central government under Iskandarov.

Thus far the impression is that Iskandarov is no independent political personage, although he evidently very much wants to be one. Like many other former top party functionaries, the ground from under whose feet was knocked out after the Communist Party went, he seeks other backing to stay in the saddle. Thus at the talks in Kolkhozabad with Kyrghyz Vice-President Felix Kulov, whom the Bishkek CIS summit authorized to lead the peace-keeping mission in Tajikistan, and Kadriddin Aslonov, the Chairman of the Kurgan-Tyube regional executive "in exile" (deployed in Kurgan-Tyube are the aforementioned Safarov units which is why the "authority" moved to Kolkhozabad), it was mostly the mullah there, who spoke.

Local residents told me that under ex-chairman Nuralli Kurbanov the Executive Committee building had been turned into a mosque and not a single meeting was held unless Islamists were present. "We shall not go to this mosque," they added.

The events that escalated into wholesale bloodshed were triggered in Kurgan-Tyube on September 2. On that day, concurrently with the start of the siege of the Council of Ministers building in Dushanbe by the "third force" and their taking of government members as hostage, both supporters and opponents of Nabiev spontaneously rallied in Kurgan-Tyube, with this eventually flaring up into armed hostilities.

Indeed, after Nabiev's resignation, his supporters considered themselves betrayed. Qualifying the victory of the erstwhile opposition as the start of the republic's Islamization, they offered outright armed resistance.



Hardly will the gunmen surrender their weapons

On September 27, backed by armour seized from the Russian 201st division, Nabiev's supporters, notably Safarov's gunmen, gained control of Kurgan-Tyube. Locals buttonholed in the streets said that they were afraid to go out-of-doors now. They described the terror rife when dominant were the armed units of the erstwhile opposition, the massacres and the tortures. Thus a locally invented "fishing" idiom, was attributed to the mutilated corpses "fished" out of the irrigation ditches.

In this city, which had before a population of some 70,000 there are today no more than between five and six thousand.

Afghan mercenaries

I was horrified by what I saw and heard in Kurgan-Tyube. Thus, the Urgutmakhala neighbourhood, an Uzbek residential area before, is virtually nonexistent today.

"I had seven sons, a wife and daughters-in-law, but I do not know where they are today or what has happened to them. I now spend the time roaming among the ruins looking for them," one ancient whom we accidentally encountered mumbled.

"For God's sake, please get us away from this place," an emaciated elderly Uzbek woman implored.

"When Safarov's men entered Kurgan-Tyube, they discovered in the premises of the Urgutmakhala District Executive Committee heaps of cutglass tableware, rugs and carpets and other loot from the relatively wealthy Uzbek neighbourhood that had

The "third force" made Rakhmon Nabiev resign

been prepared for shipment. Today nobody bothers us, as Safarov has ordered that any of his soldiers caught looting be shot on sight," locals noted.

I did not meet him as he did not turn up for his appointment with Felix Kulov, the aforementioned CIS peace-making envoy in the grounds of the Kurgan-Tyube regiment.

Conversing with me, not a single one of the regiment's offices tried to hide sympathy felt for Safarov's men. "When they're around, we don't have to worry for our families, even if his men enter our homes," they observed.

Yekaterina Lapteva asked me to notify Moscow that 32 officer wives and some 60 children were still in place. They were staying on also because they had nowhere to go. Only elderly relatives had been sent away.

When I asked her whether she had a job, she sarcastically remarked: "A job? Nonsense. Our sole concern is to take care of the kids and hope they survive."

It is said that the "Greens," as the various Islamist groupings are locally termed, seized the archives and lists of locally resident servicemen from the former Soviet contingent in Afghanistan when ransacking the local Kurgan-Tyube headquarters of the Alliance of Internationalist Fightingmen. The Afghan mercenaries the "Greens" employ hunt down and brutalize such servicemen. Thus when his house was burned down and his elderly parents were slain, one Captain Khudaberdiev, a local resident, rushed to the Russian regiment, persuaded its officers to give him an armoured carrier, and drove off in search of vengeance. Safarov is now said to have some 2,000 of these ex-servicemen.

A similar story was related at another Russian regiment quartered in Kulyab. Thus, on October 9, two compatriots from Andizhan called Senior Lieutenant Eshonov, an Uzbek by nationality, who, I was told, "is a model and recently promoted officer" and told him about the massacre of Kurgan-Tyube residents by the "Greens." Rapping on the armour, the three Uzbeks waited for the tankman to climb out and tossing a blanket over his head dragged him out. Themselves they climbed in, started up the machine and broke out of the grounds.

Locals are highly displeased with regimental CO Laktionov, who obstinately adheres to orders and does not heed their pleas to sell weaponry for money or gold. "After all," they explain, "we're on your side and don't want the USSR to break down, but you don't want to help us." When he went on leave the officers alleged he had gone because he had been threatened for his intransigence.

Laktionov's behaviour does not at all imply that other officers do not yield to pay-offs. "So what," one said, "I'll sell an armoured carrier and buy myself a house in Russia, as after all I've got to live somewhere, haven't I?" Though I suppose there was more gall than truth in his declaration, the temptation is certainly great as we all know the conditions in which the Russian officers and their families, brought back from the republics, now live.

Picking Astrakhan water-melons in Tajikistan

General Sokolov frankly observed that the sentiments prevalent in the Kulyab regiment induce apprehensions. Even though life is far less risky than in Kurgan-Tyube, the danger of corruption is much greater.

How long will Akbarsho Iskandarov hold on?

On the day before we came to Kulyab, Russophones met to appeal to Yeltsin to be provided with weapons. However, Yeltsin is far, while the Russian regiment is near and it has more than enough of weapons available.

More and more soldiers go AWOL, especially after the Russian Defence Ministry reinforced the 201st division with two Spetsnaz brigades and four battalions. Before they were shipped off, the men were told they were going out to Astrakhan for a fortnight to pick water-melons.

"It's very bad that they were deceived, so let those who sent them from Moscow take the responsibility," General Sokolov noted. He also told the officers that Russian Defence Minister Grachev had drafted an order equating servicemen in these places with those serving in the various "flashpoints," implying that one day would now count for three and that pay would be raised. "From what date?" the officers broke the silence.

How Safarov gets his armour appears clear. But how does the other side get its weapons?

The weapons come from Afghanistan. It is averred that the "Greens" don't have to pay anything on the mullahs' say so. Their opponents do though. In Kolkhozabad Umar Abdurakhmanov, the Mullah of the Kurgan-Tyube Mosque, explained that the "Shariat forbids Moslems to give bribes, for which reason the Russians support Kulyab infidels because the latter give them gold and money." People familiar with the situation on the Afghan side of the border claim that Hekmatiar's Pushtoons have a stake in the region's Islamization and so assist the "Greens" while Masoud's Tajiks, who dream of a united Tajikistan, support their adversaries.

Yet henceforth it will evidently be harder to smuggle arms across the border. Returning from the Panj border area, Yegor Gaidar told us in Dushanbe that the frontier was closed now that reinforcements had come in from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Indeed, these two republics well realize what unobstructed infiltration of weapons and gunmen via Tajikistan threatens.

Arkady Dubnov,
NT special correspondent

DUSHANBE–KURGAN-TYUBE–KOLKHOZABAD–KULYAB–BISHKEK–MOSCOW

Col. Merkulov, CO of the Kurgan-Tyube regiment of the 201st Russian division, reporting to Kyrghyzstan Vice-President Felix Kulov, the CIS peace-keeping envoy

Photos by the author and A. Toporkov/MT

Willy-nilly

The USSR is no more, but the empire is still alive

It is justly observed that characteristic of the Soviet mentality is the investment of terms and notions with the quality of reality. Even those who affirm that the Belovezhskaya Pushcha accords and the Alma-Ata Treaty setting up CIS drew the line under the Soviet empire's disintegration are guilty of that. After all, what really happened was not the empire's disappearance, but the Soviet totalitarian state's breakup into bits and pieces. What has occurred over the past few years, especially after the August 19, 1991, putsch, reveals that the basic features characteristic of empires continue to live on the remnants of the disintegrated state. Today they energetically move from the "ex-centre" to the periphery, generating there new pivots of empire-building mentality and politics.

The view current among politicians, scholars and newsmen that the nationalism emerging from heaven knows where has provoked the current instability, violence, and wars in the ex-USSR does not fully accord with reality. I think superficial if not erroneous the opinion that the Soviet Union's breakup awoke in Azerbaijanians, Armenians, Moldovans, Russians, Georgians and Abkhazians the hitherto dormant genes of reciprocal aggressiveness. Surely what has taken place and is currently taking place in present-day Georgia is not an "interethnic conflict"! Failing to ponder the matter, the onlooker may deduce that if Georgians by nationality or passport are fighting Abkhazians by nationality or passport, this is presumably an interethnic war.

Although embroiled in military political strife are as a rule people according to nationality, warring between themselves are not nations, but state political formations. Thus, fighting on the ruins of the Soviet empire are Azerbaijan against Nagorny Karabakh, Moldova against the Dniester Area, Georgia against South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Dushanbe against its periphery and so on, and so forth. Admittedly that approach radically modifies the notion as what has been taking place since the USSR's disintegration. At any rate this cannot be explained away as due simply to "outbursts of nationalism" or the product of hypertrophied national self-awareness and national ideas.

After the Soviet Union exited as a military, cultural and religious empire, the "parade of sovereignties" in most former republics began itself to acquire, or rather borrow from the "centre," the mechanisms of empire-building sovereignty. Which firstly refers to the forcible incorporation or coercion of peoples to live in a state structure along with the people or nation, around whom and under whose aegis this structure formed. Which implies the differentiation of the population of one or another republic from the angle of their actual rights, their access to the ladders of power and the enactment of laws, as, for instance, dealing with the state language, which grant privileges to the "basic" ethnic unit at the expense of other ethnic units resident in its territory. Which denotes the wish of the dominant national elite to reduce to its own likeness the ethnic national and historical heterogeneity of all ethnic units. Which signifies the urge of the leaders of the ex-republics to acquire personalized power or find a national strongman incarnating the ideological image of the Supreme Ruler. Which represents the desire of sovereign republics to form armies of their own not to safeguard frontiers, but rather to force other ethnic units in this or that republic to abide by the canon and criteria of the dominant "state" nation.

The "machineries of empire sovereignty" set up on the ruins of the ex-USSR customarily justify themselves and appeal to the international community by alluding to the principle of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. But what can one do, when the various ethnic units inhabiting these republics are loth to model themselves on the pattern of the "state nation" and be reduced to the status of pariahs in territories, where they lived for decades if not centuries? Willy-nilly acceptance is the creed of the empire-building policy, when understood as "empire" is if not forcible, then at least authoritarian amalgamation plus the effort to foist upon the periphery "behavior" models emanating from the "centre."

The phantom of an empire mentality and empire politics haunts not only the aforesaid states, but all the republics of the ex-USSR, including Russia. Admittedly Russia is striving for the time being to guard its federalism by political means, not by force, although some of her political leaders betray a patent spreadeaglism. Depending on how the Russian "centre" treats the ethnic units seeking to revise the Federative Treaty, we shall discover whether Russia has really seriously abandoned an empire and totalitarian mentality. Perchance the sad experience of the other republics will suggest the simple truth that one cannot "force love" as it were, that Russia's leadership will tell its highland peoples that they may secede if they so desire, provided they understand that there can be no half-way in this connection, that Russia is no longer an empire and will not tell them how to behave. Hopefully Russia's move would get the "parade of sovereignties," consequent upon the USSR's disintegration, to eventually shake off the machineries of empire sovereignty. While empire politics and an empire mentality exist no "peace under the olives" can be expected in the ex-Soviet Union's republics.

Yuri Furmanov



Drawing by Alexander Zudin

Sergei Stankevich the PR man

First-wave Democrat seeks to stay on in politics. Is that so reprehensible?

Democratic Russia's idyllic period is over

Photo by Arkady Dubnov

President Yeltsin's men exert a magnetic attraction for the Russian media. Who influences whom, but we learn nobody does, who rules the roost, but we again learn that nobody does, as at the top matters are as chaotic as throughout the country generally, and who decides matters for Yeltsin, but we discover that nobody actually does, as that is out of the question, are all alluring matters as everyone thinks this is where the rub lies in respect of the present state of Russian politics.

Not so long ago such a well-known politician as Sergei Stankevich, who has been somewhat in the shade of late, reminded the public that he was alive and kicking. Many no doubt think he is with the Moscow City Council. But it appears that for more than a year now he has been one of Yeltsin's advisers. By now he has quit City Hall, dedicating himself wholly to his job as adviser.

There occurred almost simultaneously several events associated with him. Thus, for the second or third time, he was approved as adviser by Presidential edict; he stood forth as patron of a socio-political centre housed in the building of the former YCL Central Committee on Staraya Ploshchad; and, finally, introduced into the public domain was the concept of great-power status which he authored.

It is actually this third event that has attracted keenest interest in the person of the Presidential adviser. On the one hand, one hears acclaim not devoid of some contempt as, for instance, the well-known phrase that the newspaper *Den* (the Day) featured to the effect that "little sensitive Stankevich has defected to the patriots;" on the other hand, Stankevich has been angrily lambasted for having sold the Democratic cause down the river.

Does he really deserve these accusations?

"Against again"

The First Congress of USSR People's Deputies which took place in 1989 is remembered for in numerous revelation. Thus, apart from already widely known pillars of dissidence, Sakharov, Popov and Afanasyev, such youngish hitherto unknown democrats as Stankevich, Boldyrev and Murashov achieved prominence as heroes there. Though Academician Sakharov was the indisputable spiritual leader and idol of the Democrats, the name of Stankevich was soon noted as closely associated with the great dissident.

Stankevich's tact and stamina, possession

on the rostrum, his ability to articulate his ideas produced impression not only upon all who watched the Congress or the supporters of the interregional group of deputies. Even Gorbachev noted him, and, it was rumoured, sought to win him over. His celebrated exclamation, "There, Stankevich has voted against again!" betrayed not only the CPSU's last General Secretary's liking for the young Democrat, but also his regret that their paths had diverged.

Featured in newspapers at the time was such a highly significant picture showing the two, Gorbachev and Stankevich, as if representatives of the country's present and future, confidentially chatting in the empty hall. It is said that in his day, Stankevich was offered several posts, more specifically, that of deputy to Nikolai Ryzhkov in the Union Government, but that he prudently declined the offer as he had his own democratic associates.

Yet, take Konstantin Lubenchenko, likewise a revelation at the Congress. Also a Democrat, he nevertheless resolved to cooperate with the Union Gorbachev authority. Where is he today? Then like Stankevich, he was seen as a young hopeful.

After the first few Congresses of People's Deputies, and partly due to his nearness to Sakharov, Stankevich was keynoted by the foreign press, acquired popularity in Europe and the USA and was awarded several Western prizes for his contribution to the promotion of democracy in the USSR. He was also found to be fluent in English, which only augmented the admiration felt.

That was a time when he revealed the ability to communicate, attract attention and handle the situation. One might recall that in the breaks between sittings at the Congress he shuttled to and from the Congress Palace to Red Square, to harangue these mass democrat supporters.

Voice from the White House

By the time elections were slated to the Moscow City Council, Stankevich's popularity reached its zenith. The Democrats wondered whom to nominate for the chairmanship of the Moscow Soviet as the Democratic Russia candidate, Popov or Stankevich, as their renown and authority were comparable, while some even believed, without any joking about it, that Stankevich had the edge.

Stankevich himself also realized that he was sitting pretty, and he certainly did not surrender at once. He assumed the office of first deputy to Popov, who had been elected chairman. After that came regular transmissions on the Moscow TV channel of the Moscow City Council sessions and weekly television appearances generally.

Stankevich chaired most adroitly, no other member of the City Council could hold a candle to him. Small wonder, as his thesis for an academic degree had dealt with American parliamentarianism. In short, he excelled in the chair and presented a charismatic image on the screen.

I well remember what a colleague of mine said at the time after watching Stankevich's brilliant chairing of the Moscow City Council sittings, "I think we are seeing a future president speaking."

What served to captivate?

After all, what did we picture as politics throughout the decades under the leadership of the CPSU? Only an amorphous faceless chap stammering, as with difficulty he read from a piece of paper the text others had written for him. Now all of a sudden we were seeing normal people! Young, nice looking chaps, knowing how to put across what they thought; in short people very much like Western politicians. If democracy amounts to procedure, then the top connoisseur and performer of Democratic ceremonies was none other than Sergei Stankevich.

Such remarks as "the honorable chairman" or the "honorable deputy" plus a knowledge of how to introduce an amendment before or after the basic text, as well as know-how in switching from microphone to microphone, and finally courtesy, coherent speech and breeding, all served to make of Stankevich the symbol of the new political scene.

However, with the passage of time it grew clear that this was all. All that was there was the image, with nothing behind it.

Star pupil

"He is such a small and neat star pupil," one schoolboy friend told me when describing Stankevich.

It has got to be said that he always had good grades. Thus, he graduated from the Lenin Teachers' Training College with honours, even though fellow students could not recall anything special about him noting that he had not been one of the stars of that student generation.

His City Hall colleagues also favourably comment, noting that he is erudite, decent, demanding and competent.

Onlookers conversant with political science and psychology underscore the point that he is a self-made man, who chose and cultivated his own manner of speech and behaviour. He seems to always be narcissistically watching himself from the sidelines as it were. He never oversteps the bounds of the image he seeks to present of himself as a young civilized politician. In fact, that image is his political capital, as unlike other self-made men from Yeltsin's retinue, such as Burbulis or Skokov, or Khasbulatov in Parliament, he has no political clout or supporters.

What does this image consist of? Stankevich is a business-like, tactful, competent politician and the best venue for demonstrating these abilities is offered by parliament, congresses and sessions, especially if televised.

Stankevich is a conscientious worker and though he scarcely has any in-depth expertize as regards economics, marketing and municipal affairs, when a dairy crisis erupted in Moscow, he put his best foot forward to cope and was greatly worried. Also when a bread scare occured he spent night after night trotting around Moscow bakeries.

Stankevich is an unassuming person, exceedingly unassuming as one sarcastic acquaintance of mine observed, having no propensity to emphasize that. He is not inclined to bring the good things he does much into the public eye, though he has done much for the Moscow constituency that returned him. A special concern has always been orphanages, and there are some orphans whom he personally taken under his wing.

Stankevich scrupulously keeps his promises. His name, especially for Western-minded, is worth much, and he knows that. He sees to it that he is always up to the mark. Whenever he ever promises to personally contribute to one or another action, he never shirks it. There was a time when he was chided for indulging in globe trotting. However few know, for instance, that he went out to Australia with a group of Chernobyl children, only because promised to do so, but that the moment he arrived, he flew back despite the 20 hours there and 20 hours back. For him that is routine, and there is no reason here to either admire him or damn him for such "folly." He is a politician with an image, and it is a good thing that he projects such an image.

What does he lack? A sense of humour, especially with respect to his own person. He is always so serious that at times he produces the impression of pomposity. No wonder some think him arrogant, snobbish, a person who can't be buttonholed that simply. On the other hand, those who know him well say he can understand a joke and himself likes to joke and will even sing to guitar accompaniment.

On the sidelines?

One of the "weak" points in his political biography is his retirement from Moscow City Hall, and his unwillingness to stake a claim to the mayorship that Popov left vacated.

I asked him whether or not he felt embarrassed now that though Muscovites had voted for him, had backed him along with Popov and had reposed their trust in them, they had both gone. Replying he said that the admiration felt for him and Popov had been excessive, and that there was yet Gonchar in City Hall who was competent to handle the organizational matters and bet-



At the First Congress of People's Deputies. Mikhail Gorbachev notices Stankevich

ter suited for the job. However to judge by his expression, I could see that this was painful for him. He does not think he behaved rightly as a gentleman should. Yet he considers himself a gentleman and sees this miscalculation on his part.

The fact that the two best-known Democrats quit City Hall, which in effect was admission of their inability to cope with the tasks they themselves had set, needs to be discussed separately. Getting down brass tacks, one may regard this as a personal fiasco for Popov and Stankevich, and for the Democrats generally. All well-intentioned towards Stankevich think that he generally had no business to muck around with City Hall inasmuch as the expert on parliamentarianism should really not appear in a body needing more experts on public utilities and the like.

As a matter of fact, Sergei Stankevich realized that it was not for him to regulate municipal affairs. In addition, he must have also felt that while the Russian White House and parliament had become the pivot of politics, Popov and he had found themselves at the sidelines.

Anatoly Sobchak is also bogged down in St. Petersburg and has also lost some of his glamour. The same has overtaken Yuri Boldyrev, who was also forgotten until appointed Chief of the Control Division. A politician must always circulate, otherwise the image fades.

Shortly afterwards Stankevich turned up by President Yeltsin's side as adviser in public relations, an office which seemed to have been specially designed for him.

Yeltsin did not forget

Yeltsin first made the acquaintance of Stankevich in that memorable year of 1987, when after his statement at the CPSU Central Committee's October plenary meeting he lost office as First Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee. Though in that same year Stankevich joined the Communist Party, he was an "informal," an activist of the Moscow Popular Front.

True, he was never the dissident, and was prepared to gratify ambition within the context of what was allowed, within the limits of the existing system and the then accepted rules of the game.

He might have sought to make the grade prior to 1985, exploiting the opportunities that the stagnation period afforded, but he was not very successful, even though one cannot regard his job with the Academy of Sciences and his thesis on the USA as setbacks. However, only Gorbachev opened the door and free thinking was allowed.

In 1987, Moscow's informals wrote a letter supporting Yeltsin and one of the first to sign it was Sergei Stankevich. Somewhat later the two met for the first time on Yeltsin's initiative. At that thorny time (scarcely could anyone have said then for sure what results the CPSU Central Committee plenary meeting would entail in the long run) Yeltsin certainly appreciated even the slightest token of solidarity. He did not forget Stankevich, which apparently came home to roost four years later, when Russia's newly elected President gave Stankevich a rather hazy job.

Why does the President need Stankevich? The point is that Yeltsin never forgets those who supported him. Moreover, Stankevich is a Democrat, of whom there are not so many in the President's retinue. So why discard well-known worthy folk?

Sergei Stankevich himself says that the President works by hunches and is irreplaceable in uncertain hazardous situations. What he, Stankevich, could do as a historian was to put reform in its proper cultural and historical perspective, with an eye to Russia's political tradition and specific historical conditions, without the knowledge of which reforms are bound to fail.

Why does Stankevich need the President? There is really no point to that question, as for every politician ambition is no vice. Only those who very much want to be in the corridors of power, find themselves there.

As for President Yeltsin's present retinue, it fales into two parts. There are some, whom the public at large really do not know, but who are already part and parcel of the President's ego, as it were. As for the others, including the rather well known and most advisers, they are in Yeltsin's retinue because they themselves offered their services, and, putting it mildly, were able to convince the President that he needed them.

There is such an office!

Rumour has more than once allotted Stankevich various jobs, now as chancellor of the Moscow College of Foreign Relations, now as ambassador to Washington, now as Minister for CIS affairs. Stankevich says that is all so much hearsay. Naturally, he does not want to leave the impression that the President is wondering where to put him for his previous services.

The year he spent as presidential adviser did not offer much, nothing in the way of significant political ideas or political actions that would be associated with him. Closer examination fails to reveal any trace of assiduous effort. One would think he had been left to his own offices, that he himself was seeking for what to do, that the President was not unduly concerned.

It is an open secret that many of the President's associates invented jobs and duties for themselves, such as the State Council, the Security Council and the like, and made the results suit their own desires. Stankevich also has a stake in that respect.

Not so long ago he submitted to the President a note explaining that Russian authority's main headache was the paralysis besetting executive structures and the destruction of the vertical system of administration. He proposed a new body, to be known as the Higher Administative Board that would coordinate the operation of all echelons of adminstration. At the end of this note, he added: "Please consider this in the light of a possible appointment." It is true that Yeltsin's men invent appointments and then expect a reply, an affirmative or a negative. Should the President nod in the affirmative that means the proposal will be accepted and then nobody will have any doubts as to who precisely would head the new body.

Stankevich is definitely on the look-out for a new political image enabling him to stay **in the swim.**

Promoting the great-power status

Most who lost sight of Stankevich after the first USSR congresses and Moscow City Council sessions, remember Stankevich as an all-out Democrat. For his admirers, the year he spent alongside of Yeltsin without generating any signs of political activity is an unknown quantity. So when he surfaced to promote the great-power status, most Democrats and their supporters were caught napping.

Yet Sergei Stankevich has not dished up to the startled public anything fresh or underivative. His concept of the great-power status is impregnated with common sense but is of the nature that others voiced earlier time and again.

He is not at all crude. On the contrary, he is quite rational. He says that unlike an empire, a great power is a state that is self-centred while accumulating the sinews for an econmic, political and spiritual upsurge. He says that Russia has her own national interests, that she bears a moral responsibility for compatriots in the other republics, and that Russophones should be invested with equal rights. What can one object to these?

Only that he echoes what has been said before. A Democrat has come to advocate great-power status. But he is not the first to have done so. That path has been long trodden, moreover, not by Astafiev and Aksyutich who incline increasingly to spread eaglism, but by such realistic, clever and well-educated MPs as Vladimir Lukin, Nikolai Travkin, Yevgeny Ambartsumov and Oleg Rumyantsev, who from the very start advocated great-power status and did not attempt to hide that. They were not liberals, and always championed a united Russia, strong state authority and tough measures should they be needed to uphold democratic authority.

Completely unrivalled in this respect is Vice-President Rutskoi, who unlike Stankevich, generates charismatic sincerity. That moderate national-patriotic rhetoric, while inherent for such an outspoken free and easy Russian as Rutskoi would sound strange coming from Stankevich, with his restrained European manner.

The only novelty Stankevich has introduced is the very term of "great power" which hitherto others had avoided using. This is his sole moderately courageous innovation.

At the beginnings of Democratic Russia, all talk about a great-power status was taboo. Though it was admitted that every nation has the right to self-determination and that every constituent republic had the right to secede, to really seriously speak of the rights of the Russophones outside of Russia was already believed indecent, and Stankevich unswervingly adhered to that view.

His mistake is that he belatedly joined the advocates of great-power status. He brings up the train for which reason he will not accumulate much in the way of political capital. Such hard-boiled patriots as Astafiev or the editor of the newspaper *Den* will not trust him; for that matter he will scarcely want to go into a huddle with them. So why, then, has he taken this stand?

He obviously does not feel he is echoing the ideas of the others who came before him.

Second wave

Generally, it is rather difficult to view Stankevich as a generator of political ideas, though his office as Presidential adviser offered pretty good chances of demonstrating mettle in the sphere of politics. After all, given good organizational capability, Stankevich could have assembled a presidential party while in the future he may have headed the presidential election campaign, which is a key position.

However, over this period, Stankevich has not amassed any political clout. It would appear that everything he does is aimed at putting himself forward from time to time so as not to be out of circulation. This may possibly be the reason for his indiscriminate contacts as his name has been associated with sundry commercial enterprises that now and again of a rather shady nature, as, for instance, the Stars Among Stars festival.

I see this, though, not as a money grubbing incentive which does not seem to accord with him as a person, but precisely as a reflection of his desire to be in the public eye.

Many are inclined to explain his advocacy of the great-power status as political time serving. "The first wave of reformers will recede, having paved the way for the second wave," he is known to have observed. That wave is indeed receding, and other ideas are being put forward. So why chide a politician or a man who seeks social commitment for wanting to be part of the second wave as well?

The past year has demonstrated that Stankevich plainly lacks the charisma to undertake major political initiatives, such as the organization of a party, the leadership of the movement or the like. In effect, he has no following, not even a team of his own. All that he has are pretty good relationships, nothing more.

Stankevich's political lot betrays an honest careerism, not career seeking at all costs, but something that is natural and is within the context of the chosen worthy image. There are limitations that Stankevich will never overstep. He will never be the extremist, no matter how politically advantageous that may be, as that will conflict not only with his image, but even with his very character.

He is not a generator of ideas, not a man capable of developing the political ideas of others, not a charismatic leader, but merely a politician designated to brilliantly discharge a representative function.

Marina Shakina

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Russia and India in the "post-confrontation" world

This autumn has proved fruitful for relations between India and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. India's top officials – ministers and their deputies, not to mention officials of lower rank – have often visited former Soviet republics, from Uzbekistan to Ukraine and Belarus. And what about Russia? As it turns out Indian delegations stop in Moscow mainly en route. Of course, there is no deliberate snub intended. The fact remains, however, that at an official level only State Secretary Burbulis made a trip to India and the latter's Defence Minister Sharad Pawar paid a visit to Russia. Considerable time has since passed, but as yet there are no concrete results seen from these visits. Is it accidental?

Possibly. At a supper recently given by an Indian diplomat, my old acquaintance, I heard rather bitter words about the present state of our relations. These present relations obviously can't be compared with the situation not long ago when Moscow represented the USSR. The breakup of the Soviet Union is having an ever more tangible effect on Russia's relations with India, and not only in the economic sphere, where obstacles were felt in the 1980s and even earlier. The very meaning, the concept of relations between the two countries is changing.

The geopolitical alliance between the USSR and India, sealed by the 1971 treaty of friendship, was important not simply by itself. It was a sort of focal point of East-South interaction, between states of the former socialist community and non-aligned developing nations. In Asia, Soviet-Indian cooperation was a counterweight to China, the Muslim world and, on a global scale, to the United States and its allies. During the Afghan war this was manifested in a concrete way. With the ending of this ill-fated war, the cold war and the confrontation between the two systems, the Moscow-Delhi relations inevitably began to lose the basis which seemed inviolable before. The breakdown of the USSR has merely speeded up the erosion of this basis. From gradual the process of disintegration has become precipitous, putting India in a highly complicated situation.

Are we saying that ties between India and the new Russia are doomed to fade completely? Russia is the legal successor to the former Union. The unimplemented plans and programmes for Soviet-Indian cooperation, about which Delhi now recalls with nostalgia, cast Moscow in a bad light, not Kiev or Bishkek. There is, however, the other side of this new coin.

Russia and India have found themselves in a similar situation in many respects. Both great nations are carrying out market reforms, and they are proceeding with difficulty. Both have decided to rely on the monetarist programmes of the International Monetary Fund, the latter's tough and unyielding stand being objectionable to both of them. All this is creating new prerequisites for any future interaction between Russia and India.

However, another factor, ethnic discord, mars the internal situation in the two countries even more. India is also virtually a multiethnic state, with religious and ethnic conflicts there being no less acute than in the Caucasus or Central Asia. It has surpassed the Russian Federation in the heat of such conflicts. That is why India's experience in combating this evil is valuable for us. Also valuable for Russia is India's experience in learning how to run a market economy, to cooperate with foreign business, and to launch joint ventures.

On the other hand, our technologies are simpler and cheaper than Western ones. They have always been highly valued in India. Have they lost their value for it? Naturally this does not depend on how the state offering them is called. The same can also be said about industrial equipment, to say nothing of oil and other raw materials.

There are also opportunities for Russian-Indian cooperation in the military-technical sphere and other related areas. "Guns for tea" – this is how India's deputy minister of trade recently formulated the basis of such cooperation. However, the matter is not so simple. The sanctions imposed by Washington last spring against the Indian and Russian participants of the deal on cryogenic engines for missiles reflects the West's nervous reaction to Russian-Indian cooperation in these spheres. Despite sanctions, the two sides continue to implement the agreement. This is convincing proof of the importance both countries attach to cooperation.

There would be no grounds for concern over Russian-Indian ties in any field were it not for one circumstance, namely, if Delhi did not question the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which has been approved now virtually by the entire world community. At their recent meeting non-aligned nations refused to support Delhi's negative stand. It is not surprising if we recall how noticeably the threat of nuclear proliferation has increased in connection with the breakup of the USSR. This threat compels nations to strengthen, not weaken, the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The world community is naturally interested in Russia influencing India's stand on this matter.

A meeting between the leaders of the two countries, scheduled for early 1993, will provide new opportunities for overcoming the existing misunderstanding, and for working out new principles of rapprochement in accord with present-day realities. A good harbinger of the success for this meeting is a possible compromise on such a mutually important question as the exchange rate of the rupee and the ruble. We'll hope for additional positive signs, whether in the economic or political spheres.

Dmitry Volsky

DOSSIER

REGULATION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION On the Implementation of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Protection of Consumer Rights"

The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation hereby rules that:

1. The Russian Federation Law "On Protection of Consumer Rights" shall take effect on the date of its publication.

2. Item 5 of Article 5 of this law shall take effect on May 1, 1992.

3. By January 1, 1993, items 1 and 2 of Article 17, items 1 and 2 of Article 18 of this Law shall be applicable to state industrial and trading enterprises. By January 1, 1993, deadlines for eliminating shortcomings of goods (work, services), as well as the replacement of faulty goods by trading enterprises and producers (performers) based on a different form of property, shall be set by agreement with consumers.

4. The government of the Russian Federation shall:

a) within a three-month period:

send to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet proposals on bringing the Russian Federation's legislative acts into conformity with the Law of the Russian Federation "On Protection of Consumer Rights";

determine a procedure for passing in a mandatory goods (work, services) certification in 1992, as well as a set of measures to prevent the import into the Russian Federation of unsafe goods;

set the stage for the repeal of departmental normative acts, including instructions regulating relations in the field of consumer rights and bring governmental normative acts into conformity with this Law.

b) within a six-month period:

promulgate normative acts provided for in item 3 of Article 18, part 2 of Article 19, item 1 of Article 23, part two of Article 24, Articles 25, 27;

prepare proposals on the procedure of compensation a consumer incurs due to poor quality of a commodity (work, service), in case of insolvency (bankruptcy) of the enterprise (entrepreneur), as well as if its assets cannot satisfy the claims of the consumers;

together with the Russian Federation State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and the Support of New Economic Structures, send to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet a plan of law-making efforts on protection of consumer rights on the basis of the experience accumulated in the world.

5. The Law of the Russian Federation "On Protection of Consumer Rights" shall be applicable to legal relations arising after it takes effect. As regards the legal relations that arose prior to its effective date, this Law shall apply to the rights and liabilities that arise after its effective date.

6. Pending the harmonization of Russian Federation legislation and the legislations of the republics in the Russian Federation with this Law, the effective legislations of the Russian Federation and the republics within the Russian Federation shall be applicable insomuch as it does not contradict this Law.

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the Russian Federation
R.I. Khasbulatov
Moscow, Russian House of Soviets,
February 7, 1992, No 2300/1–1

LAW OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION "On Protection of Consumer Rights"

This Law shall regulate relations arising between consumers and entrepreneurs, define consumers' rights to buy goods (work, services) of appropriate quality, the safety of their life and health, access to information concerning goods (work, services) and their producers (performers, traders), education of consumers, state and public protection of their interests, the formation of public organizations of consumers, as well as sets a mechanism for the implementation of these rights. The basic concepts used in this Law:

consumer – a citizen who uses, acquires, orders or intends to acquire or order goods (work, services) for personal household needs;

producer – a citizen, organization, agency or citizen producing commodities;

performer – an enterprise, organization, agency or citizen who perform work or render services;

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seller – an enterprise, organization, agency or citizen selling goods in accordance with the acquisition/sale deals;

standard – state standards, sanitary norms and rules, construction norms and rules and other documents which under the Law of the Russian Federation set mandatory requirements for the quality of goods (work, services);

mandatory certification – confirmation by an authorized body that a commodity (work, service) complies with the mandatory requirements of a standard;

shortcoming – a commodity (work, service) failing to meet requirements of stan-

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dards, terms of agreements or usually expected requirements, as well as information concerning a commodity (work, service) provided by the producer (performer, seller);

essential deficiency – a shortcoming which makes it impossible or inadmissible to use a commodity (work, service) in accordance with its purpose, or cannot be removed as regards a given individual consumer, or its removal requires much work and time or makes a commodity (work, service) something different from the definition in the agreement, or reemerges following its removal.

SECTION 1. GENERAL

Article 1. Legislation On Protection Of Consumer Rights

1. The Russian Federation legislation on protection of consumer rights shall consist of this Law and the Russian Federation bylaws enacted in conformity with it.

2. The government of the Russian Federation shall have a right to regulate relations in connection with the protection of consumer rights only in cases stipulated by the legislative acts of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation government shall not have the right to charge ministries and agencies to enact normative acts in connection with the protection of consumer rights.

3. When regulating relations in connection with the protection of consumer rights by the legislation of a republic within the Russian Federation, the norms of this legislation may not restrict consumer rights and dilute the safeguards as defined by this Law.

Article 2. Use of Legislation on Protection of Consumer Rights by Consumers in One Republic Within the Russian Federation on the Territory of Another Republic Within the Russian Federation

1. The legislation on the protection of rights of consumers in one republic within the Russian Federation shall be applicable on the territory of another republic within the Russian Federation in accordance with the following rules:

to relations arising when consumers are harmed and in pursuance of their right for life and health safety, the law is applied that is in effect at the place where the dispute is considered, and by request of the consumer, the law in effect where the consumer is harmed;

to relations based on other lawful rights of consumers, the law is applied that is in effect at the place where the goods (work, services) were acquired, unless otherwise specified by an agreement between consumer and seller (performer).

2. Provided an interrepublican agreement provides for other rules governing the application of the legislation of one republic within the Russian Federation on the territory of another republic within the Russian Federation, the rules in the interrepublican agreement shall apply.

Article 3. International Agreements

If a Russian Federation international treaty defines other rules as regards the protection of consumer rights, the international treaty rules shall apply.

Article 4. Quality of Goods (Work, Services)

The seller (producer, performer) shall sell to the consumer the goods (deliver the results of work done, render a service) of a quality meeting the requirements of the standards, the terms of the agreement, usually expected requirements, as well as information concerning the goods (work, services) that are provided by the seller (producer, performer).

The producer (performer) shall provide for the possibility of the use of a commodity (results of work done) in accordance with their purpose during their service life as established by himself or in consultation with the consumer, and in case a service life has not been set, during 10 years.

The producer shall provide for the possibility of repairs and maintenance of the commodity during the entire period of its production, and when its production is stopped, during the period specified in Section 2 of this Article.

Article 5. Right of Consumers to Safe Goods (Work, Services)

1. A consumer shall have a right to have goods (work, services), if used in accordance with the standards of their use, that do not jeopardize his life, health, the environment and do not do damage to his property in their storage or transportation. The standards set the mandatory requirements that must ensure safety of the consumer's life and health, the environment and prevent damage to the consumer's property.

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As regards individual groups of commodities (kinds of work, services), these requirements shall be set by the legislative acts of the Russian Federation.

In case of absence of standards containing mandatory requirements for goods (work, services) the use of which may do damage to life, health of consumers, the environment, as well as the property of the consumers, the appropriate structures of state administration shall immediately provide for the development and implementation of such standards, as in case of need, suspend the marketing of a commodity (the performance of work, rendering of serives) by the producer (performer, seller).

A service life period or a "to be consumed or used before" period shall be determined as regards the goods (results of work) the use of which, upon the expiration of this period, is dangerous for the life and health of the consumer or the environment or can do damage to the property of a consumer.

The consumer shall be warned of the service life or "to be consumed or used before" period of goods (results of work), required actions upon its expiration and possible consequences if the said actions are not performed.

3. The producer (performer) shall ensure the safety of goods (work, services) during the stated service life or "to be consumed or used before" period, and in case no such period is determined, during ten years.

The damages the user incurs as a result of the violation of this requirement shall be refunded under Article 12 of this Law.

4. If the safe use of goods (work, services), their storage, transportation and utilization require the observance of special rules, the producer (performer) shall develop such rules, and the seller (performer), make them known to the consumer.

5. Commodities (work, services), which are covered in legislative acts or standards by requirements seeking to ensure safety of consumers' life and health and environmental protection, prevent doing damage to consumers' property, as well as the means ensuring safety for consumers' life and health, shall be subject to mandatory certification in due order.

It is banned to sell goods (including imported ones), perform work and render services without a certificate confirming that the goods (work, services) specified in item 1 of this Article meet the requirements. Goods cannot be allowed to enter the territ-

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ory of the Russian Federation unless a certificate that is issued or recognized by an authorized body is presented to the customs services. Responsibility for the violation of safety of goods (work, services), as provided for in this item, and for ungrounded issue of a certificate is defined by item 2 of Article 41 of this Law.

6. If it is established that while the consumer observes the rules for the use, storage or transportation of goods (results of work), they cause or many cause damage to his life, health, the environment and property of the consumer, the user (performer, seller) is obligated to immediately suspend their production (distribution) pending the determination of the causes of damage done, and in case of need, take measures to recall them. Provided the causes of damage done cannot be eliminated, the producer (performer) shall stop the production of such goods (performing work; rendering services). If the producer (performer) does not meet these responsibilities, the production of the goods (performing work, rendering services) is stopped, and they are recalled by the injunction of the state management bodies monitoring the safety of goods (work, services). The damage done to the consumer in connection with the recall of goods (results of work) shall be recompensed by the producer (performer) in its entirety.

Article 6. Consumers' Right to Information

A consumer has a right to demand that the seller (producer, performer) furnish required and reliable information concerning his enterprise, the goods (work, services) it sells and the hours of work. This information is exhaustively explained to the consumers when agreements are signed for the distribution of goods (performance of work, rendering services through methods accepted in various services.

Article 7. Information of Producer (Performer, Seller)

1. The producer must inform the consumer of the name of his enterprise and its location. The said information must be contained in the trademark or be furnished in a different manner under the effective legislation.

2. Traders, utilities and other services shall have a poster specifying the profile and forms of organization of their operation, the trademark, if any, and information about the hours of work. An enterprise's poster shall indicate its domicile (location of owner). A trader, utility and other service establishment is obligated to inform consumers of their rules for the distribution of goods (performance of work, rendering services).

3. Rules established in item 2 of this Article shall apply when the trader, utilities operator and other service sector operator works on temporary premises, at fairs, in kiosks, as well as in cases when trading is done and services are rendered outside the permanent location of a trading enterprise, utility and other service establishments.

Article 8. Information Concerning Goods (Work, Services)

1. The producer (performer, seller) shall in due time furnish to the consumer the required and reliable information about the goods (work, services) enabling them to make a competent choice. Concerning individual kinds of goods (work, services), the list of techniques to get the information to the consumer shall be defined by the government of the Russian Federation and the Councils of Ministers of the republics within the Russian Federation.

2. Information concerning goods (work, services) shall contain the following: names of standards the goods (work, services) shall meet; list of basic consumer properties of the goods (work, services), and as regards foodstuffs, their composition (including a list of other foodstuffs and additives that were used in the process of their production), the weight and volume of the contents, calorie content, the content of harmful substances as compared with the mandatory requirements of the standards and counter indications in connection with certain diseases; price and conditions on which the goods (work, services) are acquired; producer's (performer's) guarantee; rules and conditions for an efficient and safe use of goods (work, services); service life, "to be used or consumed before" period for goods (results of work) and information concerning necessary actions of the consumer upon its expiry, as well as on possible consequences in case these actions are not performed; address of producer (performer, seller) and enterprises authorized by the producer (seller) to handle complaints from the consumer, as well as those doing repairs and maintenance. As regards goods (work, services) subject to mandatory certification, the consumer shall be provided with information concerning their certification. Concerning goods (work, services) which may be a threat to the life or health of the consumer under certain circumstances, the producer (performer, seller) shall inform the consumer of the kinds and possible consequences of their impact. The goods the consumer qualities of which may deteriorate with time (foodstuffs, perfumery and cosmetics, medicine, household chemicals, etc.) shall indicate their "to be used or consumed" period. As regards work (services), the consumer shall be provided with information concerning the rules of their performance (rendering).

3. The information provided in item 2 of this Article shall be provided to consumers in the technological documentation that comes together with the goods (work, services), on the label, in the form of markings, by specifying the date of manufacture or otherwise, using a technique accepted in relation to certain kinds of goods (work, services) or in certain service sectors. The package shall repeat the information on the commodity. Foodstuffs packed or pre-packed in the Russian Federation shall contain information concerning their place of origin.

4. A citizen engaged in entrepreneurship shall provide information concerning the registration and name of the authority that registered him, as well as the standard covering the goods (work, services) he distributes, and information concerning their certification.

Article 9. Hours of Work of Seller (Performer)

A consumer shall have a right to demand that the seller (performer) works the hours he announced he would work. The hours of state-run (municipal) trading, utilities and other service-sector enterprises shall be set by decision of the local administration. The hours worked by trading, utilities and other service-sector or other enterprises that are non-state-run shall be set by their owner. Officials responsible for a violation of the hours of work of state-run (municipal) trading, utility and other service-sector enterprise shall be liable under the legislation of the Russian Federation and republics within the Russian Federation.

Article 10. Liability for Inappropriate Information

1. If the presentation of inappropriate or incomplete information concerning goods (work, services), as well as the producer (performer, seller) led to: the acquisition of the goods (work, services) that do not have the required consumer properties, he shall have a right to cancel the agreement and demand restitution of damages; it is impossible to use the acquired goods (work, services) according to the stated purpose, the consumer shall have a right to be given appropriate information as soon as sensibly possibly. Should the information not be av-

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ailable within the specified period of time, the consumer shall have a right to dissolve the agreement and demand restitution of damages; damage is done to the life, health and property of the consumer, he shall have the right to lay claims against the seller (producer, performer) under Article 12 of this Law and demand the restitution of damages caused to the land owned by the consumer as private property or on other grounds, as stipulated by law or agreement.

2. Should the violation of Articles 7, 8 and 9 of this Law be systematic, the producer (performer, seller), by injunction of the Russian Federation State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and the Support of New Economic Structures and territorial bodies thereof, may be liquidated in accordance with a procedure set by the legislation of the Russian Federation.

3. When considering the consumer's claim for the restitution of damages caused by inappropriate or incomplete information concerning the goods (work, services), it is necessary to act on the assumption that the consumer does not have specialized knowledge as to its properties and qualities.

Article 11. Liability of Sellers (Producers, Performers)

1. A seller (producer, performer) shall be liable under this Law for the violation of consumer's rights. The legislation of the Russian Federation, republics within the Russian Federation or agreement between the consumer and the seller (performer) may stipulate responsibility for the violation by the latter of the responsibilities which do not carry liability under this Law, as well as increase liability.

2. Reimbursement of the losses incurred by the consumer due to deficiencies of the goods (work, services) shall be in excess of the forfeit under this Law.

3. The payment of forfeit and the restitution of losses shall not exempt the seller (producer, performer) from meeting his responsibilities before the consumer under this Law.

4. The seller (producer, performer) shall be exempt from liability for the failure to meet, or for meeting in an inappropriate manner, of the responsibilities under this Law, if he proves that his failure to meet them, or for meeting them in an inappropriate manner, was due to force majeur, as well as for other reasons under this Law.

5. A consumer's claim for the payment of a forfeit under this Law and other legislative acts on consumer's rights or an agreement, shall be met by the seller (producer, performer) on a voluntary basis.

6. When granting the claim of the consumer (public organizations of consumers) under this Law, the court shall have the right to decide that the seller (producer, performer) who violates consumer's rights must pay to the budget a fine equal to the value of the claim for refusal on part of the seller (producer, performer) to settle out of court.

Article 12. Property Liability for Damages Done Due to Deficiencies of Goods (Work, Services)

1. The damage done to the consumer's life, health or property due to a bad design, production technology, recipe or other deficiency of the goods (work, services), shall be fully restituted unless laws of the Russian Federation, republics within the Russian Federation specify a higher liability.

2. The right to claim the restitution of damages done due to the deficiencies of goods (work, services) shall be recognized as belonging to any aggrieved consumer, irrespective of whether he had contractual relations with the performer (seller) or not. The damages done to the life, health or property of the consumer shall be restituted within the specified service life, "to be used or consumed before" period, and should there be no service life period indicated, within ten years of the manufacture of the commodity (acceptance of work, service).

3. The damage caused due to the deficiency of the goods that is uncovered during the guarantee period or service life period, and if they are not established, within the period specified in item 1 of Article 18 and item 2 of Article 30 of this Law, or another, lengthier period under the agreement, shall be restituted by the seller or producer. The damage caused due to the deficiencies of the commodity that is uncovered upon the expiration of the guarantee period shall be restituted by the producer. The damage caused due to the deficiencies of work (service) shall be restituted by the performer.

4. The producer (performer) shall be liable for the damages caused to the life, health and property of the consumer in connection with the use of the materials, equipment, instruments and other means required for the production of the goods (performance of work, rendering services) irrespective of whether the level of scientific and technological knowledge made it possible to reveal their special qualities or not.

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5. The producer (performer, seller) shall be exempted from liability in case he proves that the damage is due to force majeur or improper use or storage by the consumer.

Article 13. Restitution of Moral Damages

The moral damages caused to the consumer due to the violation by the producer (performer, seller) of his rights under the legislation on the protection of consumer's rights are subject to restitution by the party that caused the damage provided its guilt is proved. The size of damages shall be set in court unless otherwise specified by legislative acts.

Article 14. Invalidity of Clauses of Agreement That Damage Consumer's Rights

1. The terms of the agreement that damage consumer's rights in comparison with the legislation-stipulated rules shall be invalid. Provided the application of the terms of an agreement that damage consumer's rights leads to losses for him, these losses shall be restituted by the producer (performer, seller) in their entirety.

2. It is prohibited to tie the acquisition of the commodity (work, service) to another. The losses a consumer incurs due to the violation of his right for the free choice of goods (work, services) shall be restituted by trading, utility and other service-sector enterprises in their entirety.

3. The seller (performer) shall not have the right to force on the consumer extra paid services. The consumer shall have a right to demand a refund for the amounts paid for the extra services rendered without his consent.

Article 15. Right to Receive Benefits and Advantages from Trading, Utility and Other Service-Sector Enterprises

The consumer shall have a right to demand the benefits and advantages under legislative acts of the Russian Federation as well as republics within the Russian Federation.

Article 16. Court Protection of Consumers' Rights

Protection of legal consumer's rights is by court of law.

A claim is filed either at court of the plaintiff's domicile or at court of the defendant's domicile or where the plaintiff sustains damage at. A consumer shall be exempt from the payment of the fee to the state in cases in connection with the violation of his rights.

(To be continued)

Will a capitalist be minister?

"I'm a very rich man. There's hardly a richer man in this country"

I had absolutely nothing to lose – there was no chance of succeeding in the research institute, where I had worked for ten years, my monthly wage of 207 rubles being a meagre sum even then. That's why as soon as the law on individual enterprise was passed, I decided to try my hand in a new field. True, the law did not directly say anything about the establishment of cooperatives. It merely hinted at such a possibility.

I remember well a huge line of people at the Moscow Soviet a few days after the law had been published. They wanted to officially register their business. I hadn't seen such a queue even in large department stores, on those rare days when scarce goods appeared on sale.

As we know, there was no real *perestroika* at that time. It was rumoured that people had been allowed to start businesses so that the authorities could know whom to arrest, all businessmen eventually being rounded up and thrown into prison.

Nevertheless, there was a crowd of people wanting to register their businesses. They stood in line even nights. The lie that the spirit of entrepreneurship in our people had completely disappeared over the past 70 years and could no longer be restored was thus exposed. Such talk was merely a justification of our inactivity.

Mediation has always been the simplest method of making money. It does not require initial capital nor strenuous organizing efforts. Therefore it was mediation that I and other members of my cooperative, Inter, undertook at first. This line of business did not yield big profit, though it helped us keep our heads above water. Mediation did not satisfy me. I wanted to take up a more serious business.

During six months, I twice attempted to organize the manufacture of some goods, even if on a primitive scale, but nothing came of it. However, I didn't give up the idea of running some type of production enterprise. In the end, learning from my bitter experience, I decided that there was no way for Inter to organize a production facility, but it would be better to buy some existing enterprise. The idea seemed absurd and ridiculous to everyone, including my close associates with whom I parted afterwards.

The first plant

It took me several months to find an appropriate enterprise and negotiate a contract on the purchase of it. But finally I achieved my aim. In March 1989, our cooperative became the owner of a plant which produced fodder admixtures – lysine – for cattle, in Byelorussia.

It would be tiring to describe all the ordeals connected with the purchase of this plant. Suffice it to say that the question was considered at three levels: in the republican ministry concerned, the State Planning Committee of the republic, and the agro-industrial department of the Byelorussian Communist Party. My project met with strong resistance in the ministry, whose officials tried to represent me as a madbrain and shady dealer. But I found unexpected backing in the State Planning Committee of the republic. Its chairman V.Kebich (now Prime Minister of Belarus) was in favor of the deal from the very outset. In the end, the Central Committee of the Byelorussian Communist Party also approved the idea.

I would like to remove possible suspicions right away. I had never before met any of the officials with whom I dealt, and was not related to any of them.

The notion of "privatization" was not yet in the air. It was the first plant to be transferred from state to private ownership. That is why, in the Soviet Union the sale of it was accompanied by a number of terms which we had to fulfil subsequently. We had to accept a larger state order, increase the total output of products and deliver them as we were told. All these commitments were later fully met. The plant cost about three million rubles, and the credit for buying it was given by the Byelorussian Ministry of Grain Products (one of the main consumers of the plant's output) at a low interest rate.

Self-generated capital

Since the credit was granted for a rather long term, I decided to use the profit brought in by the plant not for repayment, but for leasing a shop at a chemical plant in Dzerzhinsk (now it belongs to my firm). It was a risky business, of course. But nothing risked nothing gained. By leasing the shop, we organized the production of

Mikhail Yuriev, 33, married, no children. At the age of 19 graduated from the Biological Faculty at Moscow University, and for ten years worked at the Institute of Molecular Genetics, Academy of Sciences. In 1988, Yuriev organized Inter, one of the country's first cooperatives which soon turned into a large producers' association. At present he is a co-owner and director-general of Interprom, which combines chemical and food plants. Yuriev is president of the League of Industrialists and vice-president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. He is considered the richest man in Russia and one of the most probable candidates to a ministerial post in the event of a shake-up in the government.

polymer erasers, the first in the country at the time. At the cost of 2.3 kopeks for a piece we sold them to the trading network for 20 kopeks, whereas similar imported erasers cost 30 to 50 kopecks. The shop manufactured 50 million erasers a year. It was like printing money.

There appeared an opportunity to buy other enterprises, and we didn't miss the chance. In the second half of 1990, our cooperative first took a lease and then bought three state-owned yeast plants – not right away; of course, but one after another. Yeast production was a no less profitable business, the more so that I found a quite lawful means of not paying the exorbitant turnover tax, which was later repealed. The entire profit was again used for expanding production and buying more enterprises.

The technique is very simple in general. It is so-called self-generating capital. I didn't invent anything new. Most private non-stock companies existing in the world have appeared precisely in this way. But usually, as world experience shows, the self-generation of capital takes much time. Rockefeller and Ford built their companies for many years. This process can develop quickly only in the abnormal conditions under which we are living today. The present state of the economy enables those who have a starting business at first to earn superprofits. Full reinvestment brings about a very rapid growth in capital. That's the whole point.

Many other businessmen do not fully reinvest their capital. The main reason is, in my opinion, that even people far removed from business have heard about the immense difficulties bedevilling manufacturers in present conditions. On the other hand, it is well known how quickly a businessman can grow rich by speculating in computers or export-import operations. Secondly, many businessmen consider production a politically risky means of earning profit. Mills and factories are the least liquid form of capital. It is not easy to sell them quickly or turn them into something which can be hidden or exported in the event of, say, a change in the political course.

This circumstance did not frighten me because I believe there is no way of restoring the past. Some zigzags and deviations from the present course are possible, of course. But I think one cannot turn the clock back.

Businessman and society

I do not know how my life would have taken shape if I didn't change it four years ago. Most likely I would be a hard drinker, for it is painful to realize that you are an unlucky wretch. Or, giving way to despair, I would emigrate. Luckily, I have found my line of business, and it would be unjust to lament over my fate.

Today I am a very rich man. There is hardly a richer man in this country. But money is not so important for me now as it was in the beginning. I think this is natural. When the size of one's personal fortune exceeds by far the sum needed for personal consumption, at very high standards, it is not important how many millions you have. That is why if a rich man says he has so many millions, it is simply a way of quantifying success.

The aim of entrepreneurship is to make profit. It would make no sense to expect another motive of a businessman. If, striving for profit, a businessman achieves success, the fruits of his efforts are enjoyed not only by him and his family, but also by many others: the workers who get their share of the "pie" in the form of higher wages, the consumers of his goods and services, and society as a whole, for the higher profit a businessman makes, the higher taxes he pays.

But among our present businessmen there are very many speculators who buy goods without seeing them, and then resell these goods, they gamble on securities and fluctuations in the exchange rate of currencies, and so on. Society does not benefit from operations of this kind. Nor, however, is there any harm in it, because no one compels anyone to buy or sell anything.

It is like a play of cards in which there is always a zero result: some gain what others lose, but all players derive pleasure from the game, though in varying degrees.

I think the existence of this speculative group is no reason for an outcry. Society is a self-evolutionizing organism and like in any self-evolutionizing system, not all elements of it are functional. Some of them are useless. They exist simply by virtue of their viability. The same can be observed in nature. Let's take tapeworms. They are of no use. There would be no harm if they disappeared tomorrow, and perhaps nature would not benefit either. Evolution sees to it that such organisms do not cause much harm. So the matter is not that speculative business exists. It exists in the entire world. The matter is that business of this kind now plays a very big part in our country.

There is only one way of altering the present situation – a free market and free prices. At first sight, the rapid growth of speculative business is explained by free prices. But let's recall

that businessmen, dealers in particular, were the first critics of the government before and for some time after it had set the prices free in January. Later on they ceased to criticize, because what was done could not be undone. There is nothing strange here. The freeing of prices was a telling blow to them. When the prices are regulated, they can buy goods, say, for 600 rubles by giving a small bribe, and resell them for 6,000 rubles. This is what dealers did and are doing now.

Generally speaking, and this is very important to understand, big business does not need a liberal economy. It does not need a fully planned economy either, because it would be unable to exist then. As distinct from small and medium business and the greater part of the population, big business is interested most of all in a semi-liberal economy – liberal for it and not liberal for others. This explains, incidentally, why big business has never been a pillar of democracy anywhere. This is well known in countries where capitalism has existed for a long time.

Economic policy

Today the government is not scolded only perhaps by the most lazy people. All sorts of charges are brought against it: the government is incompetent, corruption thrives in it, the government is stifling and ruining industry by taxes, especially the tax on investment and the value-added tax. I do not want to pose as a defender of the government. But when charges of corruption among top officials come from people whose offices are in the government building, I would like to ask them: was it at an auction they acquired offices for their private companies in these buildings? Incidentally, the owners of these offices are usually members of the Council for Enterprise, under the Moscow municipal administration, which has evidently beat all records concerning corruption. So they had better keep mum.



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

There is a lack of understanding or conscious misinformation regarding taxes which "stifle" industry. The second is more frequent. Needless to say it would be easier to live without taxes. It is also true that the tax on investment has an adverse effect on investment activity. The question is how much this tax affects investment. I dare say investment would grow little on a country-wide scale if it were exempt from taxes. The same can be said about the value-added tax.

The economy is now hindered by the domination of state ownership. This is the main obstacle. Ninety-two percent of enterprises are still owned by the state. Why should the director of a plant make investments if it is to be privatized soon? Even if investments are exempt from taxes, for a plant will go to those who will buy it and naturally the money will go to the state budget. Would not it be better to distribute them despite any tax or simply spend them on consumer needs? Otherwise investments will never reach the work personnel. It is one of the reasons for a slump in production.

Another reason is effective demand. In view of high prices, it is not sufficient. Hence the overstocking of warehouses with products of various kinds. This also holds investment back. I would mention here frequent changes in laws, which complicate planning, inflation and the galloping exchange rate of the ruble in relation to the dollar, which makes long-term settlements absolutely impossible.

Such are real, not far-fetched reasons for an investment slump. But some find it undesirable to analyze them, because the picture would then be quite different. It would then become clear even to ordinary people that there is no way of solving these problems all in one fell swoop. It is not just a matter of repealing one tax or another.

Businessmen in politics

It is an indisputable fact that businessmen become noticeable figures in the political scene. But I would not say that this is what's behind the formation of the Party of Economic Freedom (or the party of Borovoy, as it's called sometimes). This party was founded not with the aim of expressing the interests of businessmen as a class, even if it does that. Its leader, Borovoy, founded it for himself, to make his own political career.

There is not the slightest note of disapproval in my words. The world is brought into motion by people who want to make a career for themselves in politics, science or arts. In this respect businessmen do not differ from others. Their participation in politics is not only natural, but also has substantial merits for society. It is difficult to bribe a businessman who holds a government post, and not because he is more honest than others, but because few people would be able to offer a bribe alluring to him.

The broad participation of businessmen in politics is a long established tradition in other countries. In the United States, for instance, businessmen as well as lawyers promote the largest number of politicians out of their midst. It is only important that a businessman engaged in politics should represent himself, not his "class brothers," if he holds a non-elected post, or his constituency, if he holds an elected post.

The future of Russia

The greatest danger to Russia lies, to my mind, in the search for a "third way." A certain part of our intellectual and political elite is engaged in this search. There are different motives here. Some are sincerely concerned over the country's destiny. Others simply use this slogan in the political struggle, playing on national sentiments. But regardless of motives, the very idea of a "third way" is engendered by the inferiority complex. The countries with high living standards and advanced positions in science, the economy and other spheres have no need to search for their own, "special" way. When the situation is bad, however, when a state was apparently strong and rich only recently, the people begin to look for what does not exist in nature. It hurts people to feel hopeless. In such cases they usually use methods of psychological defence.

It is time for our people and their elite to understand that if someone is richer than others there are three ways of altering the situation: first, to expropriate what such a man has amassed; second, convince oneself that though this man has more wealth you are better than him (spiritually, for instance); and, third, to try to make a much bigger fortune. I am sure that only the third way is reasonable.

Compiled by Igor Bunin and Yuri Krasheninnikov

Russia's new business

Russia has lately been selling submarines, jet fighters and nuclear fuel to other countries. It now has for sale what before was top secret, namely, photographs taken by powerful space cameras intended for gathering intelligence about military installations on earth.

These photographs, taken from spy satellites over Washington, show, for instance, the Capitol, the White House and the Pentagon. No doubt they were taken on Saturday or Sunday: at the nearby parking lots there are less cars than on weekdays.

The photographs, widely spread in Washington among intelligence experts, have created much uproar. Private experts note that Moscow's declassifying of the best photographs taken by spy satellites is likely to make the American government adopt a more constructive position on the question of opening up its intelligence archives.

The new photographs taken from space are of a higher quality than those Moscow has been selling since 1987 and which have a much better resolving power than all other photographs offered for sale. They have resolving power within less than two metres. The less distinctive pictures sold by Moscow several years ago had a resolving power of five metres.

The new photographs offered by Russia, said Dr Peter Zimmerman, an intelligence expert from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, considerably surpass materials made known by other countries till now.

New photographs are sold by the export-import concern Central Trading Systems of Arlington in Texas. Velon Minshew, general manager of the satellite photographs department for this company, said in an interview that the photographs offered for sale were actually the photographs of other photographs, and that the originals were more distinctive. He is of the opinion that their quality had been deliberately worsened.

A new step for a just-born paper

The English-language newspaper, *The Moscow Times*, took a new step in its still short existence.

It was launched only seven months ago, on March 6, 1992, as a twice weekly publication. Today *The Moscow Times* has been transformed into a daily newspaper, published Monday through Friday.

Now *The Moscow Times* is the first English-language daily to be published on Russian soil.

The notion of a daily in English seemed far away when the publisher of *The Moscow Times* came to this city almost three years ago. But thanks to the fundamental changes in Russian society and the ever growing number of foreigners and English-speaking Russians in Moscow, the time has come.

In the past seven months, *The Moscow Times* has established itself as the city's leading English-language periodical, with investigative reports, business news, political analysis, cultural features, sports and news about the foreign community in Moscow. As a rule, the standard of the paper materials is rather high. In other words, most of them are very informative and objective.

Now the newspaper is going to broaden this coverage, adding international news, an expanded opinion page, many new features and a weekend arts and entertainment section.

As faithful readers of *The Moscow Times*, the editorial staff of *New Times International* share this belief and wish the team of *The Moscow Times* every success.

Mutual support – the way to success

A founding conference of the Council of Russian Entrepreneurs was recently held at the Rusian Academy of Management in Moscow. A decision to set up such a council was adopted at a world meeting of Russian businessmen during celebrations called the Days of Slav Written Language and Culture. The sponsors of the council hope that in conditions of the transition to a market economy, Russian emigrant businessmen can help their compatriot businessmen not only by business offers but also by representing their interests abroad and using their free-market experience.

The organizers of the council have defined its main tasks as the exchange of trustworthy information on business in Russia and abroad, new laws in the economic, banking and custom spheres, and assistance in the holding of talks, meetings and presentations of firms and in the conclusion of deals. On the premises owned by the council, its members can display their goods. They can also take part in exhibitions which it organizes in Russia and abroad. The council will help its members in getting visas, booking hotel rooms and tickets, and provide all assistance necessary to businessmen.

Management elite for Russia

It seems reasonable for us to act as sponsors of students, said Prof. Jacques Barrat, president of the inter-university association Eastern Europe–France. Among its grant-aided students are young people from East European countries, including Russia and Ukraine. They are studying at the best universities and most prestigious schools of France, such as the Paris Institute of Political Sciences, the Higher Commercial School, on the law faculty of Paris University II, and the National Agronomical Institute.

Barrat pointed out that the inter-university association seeks to give these students knowledge in the field of micro- and macroeconomics, finances and management. In short, they receive what could be called the capitalist type of education which was absolutely unknown in Russia till recently. The association lays emphasis on management and is going to train highly skilled experts and the management elite of Russia. Such people in the past were either annihilated or not given a chance to show their worth.

South Africa, new Russian partner

Russia is a huge market for South Africa, and Russian-manufactured goods, light aircraft and other Russian exports are in high demand in that African country.

Chief Designer at the Yakovlev Design Bureau, Alexander Dondukov, said that their company had already received proposals for the shipment to South Africa of Yak-55M aircraft and the production of a cross between the Yak-46 and the Yak-112 aircraft. The Yak corporation's interests in South Africa are represented by Mr Edward Ross, CEO of the Consolidated Aviation. There are plans for cooperation with South Africa's biggest company, Atlas, which controls the entire South African industry.

It has become known that a South African corporation is very interested in Russian Niva cross-country cars.

A joint Russian-German enterprise began the building in South Africa of a factory to manufacture solar batteries with the raw materials and components coming from Russia. South Africa provided the know-how.

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The Kuril barrier

The danger of surprise attacks from the sea and of US and Japanese landing operations against the Maritime Territory is greatly exaggerated

Does the islands' strategic role outweigh the political and economic arguments in favour of their transfer?

Photo from Newsweek (USA)

The opponents of handing over the islands to Japan argue that the loss of the Southern Kurils, with their airfields and radar stations, would leave a gap in the integrated Far East defence system. This would narrow down the system of monitoring air and sea situation, hinder the access of ships, submarines (strategic ones included) and planes of the Pacific Fleet to the high seas and their air support. At the same time, the potential enemy would have a ready access to the Sea of Okhotsk in this case. This would put the strategic surface missile carriers on patrol duty there in jeopardy and expose Sakhalin and the Maritime Territory to missile and air strikes from the sea and to US and Japanese landing operations.

These arguments merit serious consideration. There is no denying that with all the other conditions being equal, it is better to have those islands than not to have them. The question arises, however: are they really so indispensable strategically, and do strategic arguments outweigh the political and economic ones in favour of relinquishing the islands?

Missile arithmetics

It should be taken into account that the Sea of Okhotsk is not Russia's inland water area, anyway. Its southern coast is the Japanese island of Hokkaido where, according to our General Staff's data, Japan's strong Northern Army and US units are deployed. These are capable of ensuring, from shore, the naval breakthrough into the Sea of Okhotsk, by way of the straits south of Sakhalin and Kunashir.

Further, if, in the General Staff's opinion, "we won't have much of a chance – and in case of the outbreak of hostilities no chance at all to strengthen the Kuril group" – then the role that Russian units have to play on the islands is purely symbolical. For how long will our 7,000-strong garrison, with its 40 tanks and 30 planes, hold out against the enemy's ground and air forces, which are ten times superior numerically, plus strike aircraft carriers and amphibious assault units?

According to military experts, the enemy "can capture the South Kurils by swift airborne and amphibious action." Besides, by a concentrated effort of its aircraft carriers and amphibious forces, the enemy can break through into the Sea of Okhotsk via any other navigable straits between the Kurils with nothing but frontier and radar posts stationed on them.

At the same time, the danger of surprise attacks from the sea and of US and Japanese landing operations against the Maritime Territory are greatly exaggerated. About 60 assault planes based on two American aircraft carriers and an Okinawa-stationed Marine division – even combined with Japanese forces – are not much of a threat to Russia after all. Let us remind the reader that at the beginning of 1991, after six months of preparations, 10 divisions, over 1,000 planes and six aircraft carriers were committed to action against Iraq. And this in a situation where the anti-Iraqi coalition had absolute superiority in the air and at sea.

Russia is no Iraq. We have about 900 combat planes, 60 large warships and 90 multipurpose submarines in the Far East (more than 40 of them being nuclear-powered). Another 800 planes are deployed in regions bordering on China. There are also up to half a million troops, over 20,000 armoured vehicles and 15,000 artillery pieces. If this proves not enough, then one division and one air regiment on the Kurils will not be of much help either.

Survivability of missile carrying submarines is an extremely important problem on which global strategic parity and stability depend. In the light of the above, however, even their safety is not guaranteed in the face of American and Japanese anti-submarine forces. Russian seaborne missiles call for a large number of escort ships, which cannot but be taken by Japan as a potential threat to its coast and communications. The result is a tight knot of military confrontation between Russia, on the one hand, and the US and Japan on the other in the western part of the Pacific.

Now we have 38 missile carriers in the Northern Fleet and 24 in the Pacific Fleet.

Concluded from No. 42

Under a new strategic arms limitations treaty of June 1992, their total number will be reduced to 23-25. Will the problem of submarine protection in the Sea of Okhotsk exist at all if all the subs are concentrated in the north? There are serious operational and strategic arguments in favour of this option. Otherwise the problem will have to be solved through the limitation of naval forces and their activity, which calls for Japan's cooperation in some form or other. In any case, Russia's missile carrying submarines will be present in the Pacific for at least a decade, and this ought to be borne in mind when dealing with the Kurils problem.

In the present political situation such a line of reasoning may sound like a hangover from the Cold War times. Nevertheless our military experts talk sense when they insist that we should not turn a blind eye to the grim realities of the strategic balance. The other side approaches the matter very cautiously and pragmatically. Strategic realities should be changed purposefully – and bilaterally.

And now we are coming to the main conclusion derived from the analysis by Russia's General Staff and Naval Command, even though one may not agree with it on a number of points. The conclusion is: it makes no sense at all to hand over the islands to Japan if the existing strategic situation persists, even despite the South Kurils' limited military importance. This can be done only as part of a radical restructuring of strategic relations in the region as a result of which the USA and Japan cease to be Russia's hypothetical enemies in Asia.

On the Camp David principle

Russia's present position in the Asian-Pacific Region is lamentable economically, unfavourable politically and most vulnerable strategically. What's more, this position is bound to get ever worse even if we keep the Southern Kurils and even if we step up our military presence there.

At the same time, we may strengthen our positions in the region by radically restructuring our relations with other countries. The matter does not simply boil down to our relations with Tokyo, of course – and there are many other issues to settle besides that of the four islands. The Archimedean lever, though, lies in Russo-Japanese relations which, in turn, cannot make any headway without the Kurils problem solved first.

From the viewpoint of the abstract notions of "fairness and legality," we owe the Japanese nothing. The choice is fully ours. We may keep the islands and deliberately accept all the consequences to ensue from the further degradation of our positions in the region. Or we may take advantage of the situation and exchange them, on the Camp David principle, for something much more important from the angle of security and, later, from the angle of economic well-being.

As the first step, we may hand over to Japan (in accordance with the agreement ratified in 1956 and arbitrarily denounced by Moscow in 1960) the smaller two islands, Shikotan and Habomai, which are not as important militarily as the other two. The peace treaty signed as a result would lay the groundwork for the restructuring of relations between the two states.

As to the two larger islands, Kunashir and Iturup, this is a much more complicated matter which will take much longer to settle. In exchange for Russia recognizing Japanese sovereignty Tokyo is to recognize Russia's special military and economic interests and to agree to Russia keeping its installations there for another 10-15 years. Japan is to promise not to interfere with their functioning and never to set up its own or foreign military bases or installations on any of the islands. The dismantling of Russia's military installations will be conditional on a stage-by-stage fulfilment of other terms of the agreement.

Specifically, these commitments are to be combined with measures to cut the armed forces of Japan, the US and Russia in the Far East, agreements on curtailing the activity of air and naval units (particularly of anti-submarine and airborne forces), on imposing certain restrictions on battle exercises and on confidence-building measures. Formerly, our abstract suggestions of such measures used to be rejected by the US and its allies outright. We had largely ourselves to blame for that – Soviet initiatives were of unilateral advantage to us and untenable from the military-technical and operational viewpoints. There is vast room for improvement in the activities of Russia's diplomats and military in that part of the world.

At the same time, we have reason to demand that the US should change its approach after Russia has made deep cuts in, and changed the structure of its strategic forces under the treaty of June 1992. As to Japan, if it wishes to get the islands, it ought to show interest in these questions and find a way of influencing Washington's position. After all, its main traditional argument was that restriction of naval might would undermine American guarantees of security for its transoceanic ally.

In the long run, not only the four islands, but the entire Kuril archipelago, Hokkaido and Sakhalin may be fully demilitarized. As other countries are drawn into regional security system, it will be necessary to provide for smooth interaction between armed forces – naval units, above all – in peace keeping, repelling acts of aggression in the region, and protecting communications.

It is only under these conditions that Russia and Japan will have extensive opportunities for economic cooperation, beginning with the Southern Kurils, and with the Far East and Siberia subsequently included into the system of the APR's economic integration.

When working out the islands transfer mechanism, the attitudes of the local civilian population should be taken into account, of course. Those who stay will have to have all their rights (property rights included) guaranteed, and those who choose to leave are to be paid full compensations. The latter should be paid to recipients directly, not contributed to any state programs, in which case they would be squandered and embezzled by civil servants. Losses and expenses should also be compensated for to Russia's servicemen and economic organizations.

And now the last thing. The transfer of the islands will create no legal precedents as regards other frontiers of Russia all of which have been drawn in accordance with the procedure established by international law. In general, historical experience shows that when settling territorial disputes a precedent is not worth a brass farthing as an argument. Such disputes are settled on the basis of a broad alignment of forces and correlation of national priorities.

In order to see where the sources of danger to Russia's sovereignty and integrity lie today, suffice it to go and compare the situation in the Kurils and in Hokkaido, or in Chukotka and Alaska. This danger comes not from the outside, but from within. In order to guarantee Russia's integrity and sovereignty, it is necessary to put an end to economic chaos and mismanagement, to lay the groundwork for the rule of law in our society, to place the army under political control, to strengthen our ties with other CIS republics and to balance our relations with the neighbouring countries. Otherwise disintegration will be inevitable, irrespective of the fate of the four islands in the Pacific.

Alexei Arbatov,
D.Sc. (History),

Boris Makeyev,
Captain First Class,
Candidate of Naval Sciences

The rules of the game in geopolitics

How to shape Russia's national security concept? **Vladimir BARANOVSKY,** expert from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), interviewed by *New Times* correspondent **Alexander POLYUKHOV**

New Times. The diversity of current judgements concerning Russia's strategic position boggles the mind. They vary from slogans like "The motherland is in danger" to assurances that "The state has no external enemies." The break-up of the empire provides many arguments in support of any view point. But the Kremlin must have a coherent security policy. There is the Security Council of Russia, but there is no blue print. Who must be the one to design it?

Vladimir Baranovsky. In any state there is usually a community of people engaged in foreign policy, related scientific research, intelligence and military affairs. In the course of argument they evolve a set of ideas which develop into a blue print. This plan must be acceptable to society within the country and understandable for partners or opponents abroad.

In Russia, such a community is only shaping from the ruins of the Soviet system. There is no "black box" containing a thick file where everything is explained in detail. For instance, in SIPRI I head the project "Priorities of Russia's security policy." Experts will be able to complete it in a couple of years.

Looking towards the future

N.T. *Homo* is called *sapiens* because he is guided in his actions by intellect, not reflexes. A sound policy of national security can be pursued even without a plan if each action is carefully thought out beforehand. Are there any lapidary rules of the game in geopolitics?

V.B. The obvious aim is to create a favourable international environment for Russia; favourable to the maintenance of stability and for her success in economic and democratic reforms.

Naturally, Russia must be concerned with the preservation of its state integrity and seek to minimize the external factors of disintegration. It is important to prevent neighbouring countries' conflicts from spreading onto the territory of Russia. For this purpose Russia must take part not in **conflicts** but in their **settlement.** Russia should settle internal conflicts on its own. It must not allow the internationalization of such conflicts because in such a case their outcomes will depend on forces hostile to it or ignoring its interests.

To compete or cooperate with Ukraine? To "forget" about Central Asia or to remember the need for a balance of forces with the Moslem world?

N.T. Though academic, it is an indisputable argument: life demands a promt reaction to events, and the situation is critical now.

V.B. That merely emphasizes the need to act with restraint and great caution. Russia will have to coexist with its neighbouring states in the future. Why add new offences to past ones? Ukraine is an independent power, and Russia should deal with it accordingly. Moscow should also reconcile itself to the loss of the Baltic states and, hence, to the drastic cutting back of its oulet to the Baltic Sea. It is a bitter truth, but illussions are dangerous.

N.T. At first, Russian troops began to evacuate from Eastern Europe, and now they are withdrawing from the fringe areas of the former USSR. It will be recalled that Britain first left its colonies and then pulled out troops when evacuating from the



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

bases east of Suez. The world did not collapse then, and the sun rises as it did before. But at the time there were many fears.

V.B. The analogy deserves attention. Britain has retained a considerable influence in the liberated colonies because it left them in time and in a fair manner. It has even partly retained military ties, let alone political and economic. Russia is now faced with a choice: either it abandons controlling claims over the periphery of the former USSR or it will be compelled to. The first approach will enable Moscow to ensure at least part of Russia's interests, and the second one will merely bring more trouble, if not danger to it.

Table of ranks

N.T. The importance of other republics for Russia is to be reappraised. Is it worth fighting for the survival of the prematurely born Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or would it be better to say good-bye to former "brothers?" What is more preferable for Russia's national security?

V.B. The CIS is an attempt to establish a structure for interaction between republics. Any success would be beneficial in this respect. Russia is no longer the ruler of destinies. Moscow will not maintain equally intensive ties with all states. It must pursue a differentiated policy, but without discrimination. It is a thankless occupation to rank states according to their priority for Russia.

N.T. Not according to their importance, but from the standpoint of the gravity of their conflicts. Let's begin with Transcaucasia.

V.B. Armenia and Georgia have long been closely linked with Russia, and it would seem logical to regard them as privileged partners in Transcaucasia. However, such a partnership should be cultivated very carefully so as not to be taken as evidence of opposition to the Moslem component in the region.

N.T. What about Central Asia? It is called "the Asian tail" blocking Russia from Europe. At the same time, the special value of Kazakhstan for Moscow is stressed.

V.B. The importance of Kazakhstan is exceptionally great: a large Russian population, economic interests, a long border with China, strategic installations.

It would be wrong to leave other republics out of the picture. True, they are not as important for Moscow, though Russians live there and conflicts involving Russia are possible. The main issue is that Central Asia can play a tremendous role in the balance of forces between the Christian and Moslem worlds. It would be a short-sighted policy to estrange the Central Asian republics from Russia and, hence, Europe. Moscow's responsibility in the region therefore has a global character.

N.T. How to act more reasonably in Eastern Europe? For instance, conflicts can be ceased by joining Moldova to Romania and the Dniester Republic to Ukraine in exchange for returning the Crimea to Russia.

V.B. Romania evidently wants to enlarge its territory. But wouldn't that destabilize the already unstable balance in the Balkan Peninsula and in the zone of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire in general? I am not sure that Ukraine dreams of enlarging its territory, because it has fears over the future of the Crimea, as well as over the Northern Bukovina and the Transcarpathian regions.

It is dangerous, in principle, to begin the first division of the post-Soviet state. If Moldova disappears it will be difficult to preserve the territorial integrity of other republics, Russia included. Moscow is interested in keeping Moldova independent by ensuring an acceptable status for the Dniester Republic.

N.T. The dialogue between Moscow and Kiev is now and then interrupted by squabbles and threats. What will this lead to?

V.B. Ukraine is now in the formative period and it gives queer signals, even threatening ones at times. Moscow has to put up with this and make a choice: to regard Kiev either as an ally or as a rival. Coopration between the two countries is a difficult but realistic aim. Its results will obviously exceed any questionable gain from rivalry. Some competition and sporadic break-downs in relations between Russia and Ukraine are inevitable. Nevertheless, Moscow should not give more arguments to anti-Russian forces in Ukraine by taking careless or even rude actions. It would then be easier for Kiev to step on the path of cooperation.

N.T. Can Belarus be considered a reliable ally of Russia?

V.B. I think Russia should carefully take advantage of the quiet atmosphere for a rapprochement with Belarus, avoiding steps likely to create misunderstanding and tension. In this respect Moscow should draw a lesson from Minsk's reaction to the Yeltsin-Kravchuk agreement on the Black Sea Fleet. Similar decisions are not to be taken behind the back of the closest ally.

N.T. Can Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia be considered "traitors" or partners?

V.B. Moscow should not feel hurt. The Baltic states have more grounds for offence. The way should be cleared for building Russia's policy in the north-west jointly with the Baltic states. By using economic and other ties, Moscow can establish mutually beneficial cooperation with them. Troops must be pulled out as soon as possible. This will allow Russia to avoid international complications, the growth of anti-Russian sentiments in the Baltic states, and the whipping up of hysteria over the Kaliningrad Region. Such a policy will benefit Moscow more than military and political tension. Russia's access to the Baltic Sea will not be completely shut and Russians will suffer less.

What policy Russia should pursue

N.T. Does the danger remain from former opponents and today's partners (or almost allies) – NATO and the United States?

V.B. The objective potential of confrontation becomes minimal. The West is no longer an opponent for Russia, and former vigilance is inappropriate. Cooperation is already being established, through the Nourth Atlantic council in particular, but it can become wider, for instance, in joint operations for the maintenance and restoration of peace in conflict zones.

Powerful military forces become allies when an equally strong enemy appears. There is simply no such enemy today, though such a danger is possible in the future. Theoretically, confrontation between the South and the North is possible, and if it arises a union between the above-mentioned military forces will prove desirable. However, there is no reason to speed up such a pact because the South would regard it as a threat to itself.

N.T. There are fears that the West will not agree to close cooperation with Russia in general until it "digests" Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, Ukraine and others.

V.B. The future of our relations with Europe is being decided not abroad but in Russia, by the course of our reforms. There is only one indispensable condition, namely, the compatibility of Russia with Western society. If it appears the "marriage" will take place.

N.T. Japan and China remain to be mentioned.

V.B. Long-term relations with Japan are hindered by short-term problems. They must be solved in order to open up the prospects for further cooperation. It is certainly in the interests of Russia.

Clear facts must be taken into account in evaluating China: a vast country, a great power, a close neighbour, a society with impending upheavals. All-round cooperation, without intriguing against the West, will only add to Russia's authority in the world and allow it to exert influence in many complex situations, including Asian affairs. The "China card" does not exist. Though Russia is in geopolitical proximity to China, whereas Europe lies far away from it.

N.T. Does Russia's national security interests spread beyond China? Are we fated to forget about the Third World forever?

V.B. There are, of course, India and other exceptions, but the former ambitions must be buried. There is no longer, however, any need for Russia to overstrain its resources and the sphere of possible conflicts with Western partners is being narrowed.

STOCKHOLM

Poet **Alexei Didurov** thinks one can avoid lying in literature by writing about what he knows best. That is why he himself is the main character of his collection of poems. At the age of 15 Alexei began to work as a correspondent for the newspaper *Komsomolskaya pravda* and then in the magazine *Yunost* (Youth). As years passed he understood he was not needed by the state and tried to make it in another way. He dismissed the alluring future of a journalist and the comfortable life of an author of variety hits and became absorbed in creative "underground" work.

April 1985 was marked not only by Gorbachev's promise of democracy. In the "underground" of talented and outcast writers a rock group, *Artificial Children*, was founded. Its name was a symbol for people shaped in the struggle against the state on the ideological front, so to speak. Alexei Didurov was the founder and inspirer of this group.

Today Alexei Didurov receives congratulations from friends and "sour" messages from those who used some of his verses in their own poems. The first book of Didurov's, entitled *Variations*, is to be put out soon.

■■■

Yuri Shanibov joined politics as physically well-trained people enter a cold mountain river – without fear, almost headlong, but without recklessness and being sure not to lose their footing. He hardly expected his life to change so radically, after all, he had lived a good part of it already. Shanibov, 56, is married and has two children. He has made a good career. A Kabardin by nationality, Yuri graduated from the faculty of law at the local university and defended his thesis for the degree of Candidate of Science in Philosophy. He was a teacher in the political science department of Kabardino-Balkar University.

As in the case of many people during these times of radical change, politics impetuously intervened in his life. In the spring of 1990 Shanibov took part in the Assembly of Highland Peoples of the Caucasus which elected him Chairman of this organization. Having become head of the assembly, in which only Moslem nationalities are represented, Yuri changed his name to the traditional Moslem name Mousa.

In the autumn of 1991 the assembly met in Sukhumi, Abkhazia. It transformed the organization into a Confederation of Highland Peoples of the Caucasus. The confederation united representatives of 16 nationalities, with Shanibov

being elected as President. The organization has not been registered anywhere, but its influence among the highland peoples in the South of Russia is rapidly growing. The popularity of Mousa Shanibov is growing too. His calls for the unification of highland peoples into a highland republic meet with ever more enthusiastic responses. The authority of confederation has increased, especially after its armed groups had come out in support of the people of South Ossetia, and lately, sided with the forces fighting for the separation of Abkhazia from Georgia. Their support played an important part in the Abkhazians' military successes.

Relations between the confederation and the Russian authorities have been seriously aggravated. Last month, in Nalchik, by a decision of the Russian Ministry of Justice, a group of officials of the prosecutor's office and Security Ministry of Russia arrested Mousa Shanibov at night in his home and took him away in an unknown direction. The daughter ran out of the house and was able to inform Shanibov's associates of his arrest. Riots broke out in the city, Shanibov was put in a Rostov prison. He was charged with carrying arms without special permission. In some inexplicable way Shanibov managed to escape from prison. He addressed a special congress of the confederation held in Grozny. Shanibov denounced the "Georgian invaders," who had moved their troops to Abkhazia and threatened to send 40,000 highlanders against them. The leader of the confederation warned that "a second Caucasian war" had already begun and that the threat of Russia being involved in it was quite real.

The new old diplomat

The new occupant of the house on 63, Unter den Linden, Berlin, where the Soviet embassy in the German Democratic Republic was in the past and which is now used as a branch of the Russian embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany, is 59-year-old **Valentin Kopteltsev,** who has long been known to German diplomats and politicians.

A career diplomat who knows German and English, a lover of parties and receptions, Kopteltsev worked as a counsellor-minister in the Soviet embassy in Bonn in the mid-1970s. His career was furthered by his work in the foreign-policy propaganda department of the party's central committee, widely known as the Department of International Information.

On the eve of the anti-Honecker uprising in October 1989 Valentin Kopteltsev said: "We do not think that the German Democratic Republic needs reforms." Several weeks later, just two days before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Kopteltsev was convinced that the border between the two German states, though not very rigid, would remain. In his opinion the border and customs posts should have remained so that enemy intelligence could not operate freely.

In the demonstrations then held in Berlin and Leipzig with the demand for reunifying Germany Kopteltsev saw the desire of East Germans to improve socialism. He flatly denied at the time the possibility of the reunification of the two states and regarded talks on this subject not only groundless but also harmful.

The Mexican TV soap-opera *The Rich Also Weep,* which has greatly influenced the rhythm of life in Russia, also radically changed the life of **Edith Gonzales,** then a very young actress, who played the part of Marisabel, an adopted daghter of Marianna and Luis Alberto.

There is perhaps nothing Mexican in her appearance. She is a blue-eyed slender girl. In the opinion of Edith, it is the result of a striking play of genes in her distant Spanish ancestors.

At the age of five she took part in the popular TV programme *Every Sunday*. Edith was only 14 when she was invited to play in the film *The Rich Also Weep*. The girl admits that she accepted the invitation reluctantly. In those years she preferred a care-free life with her girlfriends to the endless takes on the set. Edith liked it least of all when the film producer insisted that she become a jet-black haired brunette.

The film catapulted her career. Shortly after the TV serial was shown Edith was invited to prestigious theater schools in Los Angeles, New York, Paris and London. On return she was offered to play the main part in new soap-operas.

"In many countries, the United States for instance, far from the best actors play in TV serial films," Edith Gonzales told a *New Times* correspondent. "The situation is different in Mexico. Eminent actors consider it an honour for themselves to play in soap-operas. This genre is considered the most popular in our country. Besides, as distinct from the Mexican cinema and theatre, the national television company Televisa, which produces serial films with a striking speed, is a rich organization and this helps us to make a good living."

Edith admits that she does not know Russian literature very well. It turned out later, however, that she had read stories and novels by Gorky, Chekhov, Tolstoy, Gogol and Dostoyevsky. "I was struck by the characters from the novel *The Idiot*. For instance, I would play with pleasure the part of Nastasya Filippovna," Edith added. "As for the part of Anna Karenina, it is the dream for any actress."

"Unfortunately, the position of women in our society remains unequal even in our time," Edith says with regret. "It is a reason for personal tragedies, often with a similar outcome to that of Tolstoy's Anna Karenina.

"Man must build his own life"

Dossiers on him were kept at the KGB as well as in the files of a number of newspapers and magazines. They contained "secret documents," including compromising material against him. His behaviour was discussed even by the Politburo. In the end, he was forced to leave his homeland, vowing to never return as long as power is held by the Communist Party, which he considers a fascist organization. The party was eventually dissolved, and an outstanding Russian artist is back in Moscow again. The younger generation has the chance to become closer acquainted with him.

The man concerned is **Yuri Lyubimov,** born on September 30, 1917, in Yaroslavl. He studied at a school under the direction of the Vakhtangov Theatre in Moscow, then worked in the song and dance company of the NKVD, later ministry of the interior of the USSR. Yuri Lyubimov was noticed by Nemirovich-Danchenko, a prominent figure in the theatrical world of Russia. In 1946 he began to work in the Vakhtangov Theatre, then directed by Nemirovich-Danchenko. Some time passed before Lyubimov learned the truth about Soviet reality and understood the motives of genuinely creative work. For a rather superficial film of the times he was awarded the Stalin Prize, and within two years the title of honoured artist of the Russian Federation was conferred on him.

In 1964, remaining an actor of the Vakhtangov Theatre, Lyubimov was appointed Chief Producer of the Taganka Drama and Comedy Theatre in Moscow. The theatre began to thrive under his direction. It became highly popular among theatre-goers. At the same time, its relations with the authorities grew worse. Recalling Lyubimov's collisions with party censors, old theatre-goers wonder what absurd and wretched claims they laid on the artist, posing as champions of high ideals.

The criticisms of plays objectionable to the authorities and the struggle for the right to perform them were a great strain on Lyubimov's nerves. The matter came to its logical end. In 1984 he left the Soviet Union. Lyubimov was stripped of his citizenship. But he wasn't broken. He realized his dreams in the world's most famous theaters.

In 1989 Lyubimov returned to Moscow. He acquired Soviet citizenship and was restored to the post of Artistic Director of the Taganka Theatre. By a presidential decree he was awarded the title of People's Artist of Russia. It was not an easy return, however. His stormy creative temperament, personal likes and dislikes did not always matched with the atmosphere of the renewed company. Lyubimov remained true to his habit of travelling frequently. He's not at the theatre that much, working mainly under contracts in various countries.

Yet, as years passed, Lyubimov penetrated deeper into the secrets of theatrical art and gained a more realistic vision of the purport of life.

"Everyone is now busy with survival, not work," the master says. "People have understood at last that life is not socially secured. Man must build his own life, as is done everywhere in the world."

Russia across the Hudson River

Over two million Russians have settled in America. Many of them have found a new life there and are prospering. But unlike other ethnic groups, the Russian community plays no active political role

When you live in New York, you are under the impression that apart from our "capital of the world," there are no more than a dozen other cities worthy of attention on the country's map. However, the émigré geography looks different. Russians have settled in many states from Alaska to Florida. Even near New York, there are several enclaves where one can see the golden domes of Orthodox churches and hear Russian speech in shops. Recently I visited one such spot in the vicinity of New York.

The town of Nayack, New Jersey, lies amidst thick verdure near the mighty Hudson River – beautiful cottages, calm and peace. Its population is about 30 thousand people, mostly Americans, but there are also about 1,500 of our compatriots living there and in its suburbs.

The local Russians reached America many dozens of years ago. They are the so-called "second-wave emigration" as well as descendants of the first. They are a rather close-knit ethnic community. I came here with the intention of familiarizing myself with people whom one doesn't often encounter; I wanted to understand what forces hold the Nayack Russians together? What is their religious and political orientation? What are they concerned with? What do they think of us the "third wave"? And lastly, what's their view on current events in our motherland? I posed these questions to a dozen Nayack Russians aged 25 to 80. The general opinion was that the main force uniting the Russian population in this locality is the Orthodoxy, Faith and the Church. That's why I was advised to begin my inquiries with Father Georgy Larin, the prior of the local Church of the Protective Veil.

Under golden domes

Georgy Larin is 58. His destiny is typical of a person belonging to the "first-wave emigration." His father, a White Guard officer, left Vladivostok together with the remaining units of the defeated anti-Bolshevik army in 1922. He was one of many hundred thousands of Russian people who fled from communist tyranny. His son was born in Shanghai. When in the 1960s Chinese communists began to "tighten the screws" on the country, Russian émigrés were once again forced to look for a new refuge. At first Georgy Larin went to Australia, later coming to the United States. Here he became a divinity student and then, more than twenty years ago, the prior of the Church of the Protective Veil in Nayack. The cathedral belongs to the Orthodox Church Abroad. Mass is served in the Old Church Slavonic language.



Brighton Beach, the largest North American Russian-speaking centre

Nayack is situated not far from the famous Tolstoy Farm started by Leo Tolstoy's daughter. The Tolstoy Fund created by her for decades helped Russian people who had lost their motherland reach this place. Gradually, settling around the farm, the newcomers founded a Russian colony. Not far off are situated the Novodiveyev Monastery and a Russian cemetery, along with a village, called Otrada, with a cultural centre functioning there. Novodiveyev, Otrada and the Tolstoy Farm have their own churches. In 1955, the Russian residents of Nayack also decided to build a church of their own.

My special interest was roused by the history of the local church and of the building which, according to Russian standards, would be called a House of Culture. The local Russians dreamed of having a church since the late 1940s. But building a church is no easy matter, not to mention its cost. At one time, having raised a little money, the local residents

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bought a plot of land which turned out to be inconvenient for building. They exchanged it for another and continued to actively gather donations and no less actively argue over where and what to build. The most austere ones objected to using money earned at dancing halls and concerts for building the church, but construction progressed in spite of all disputes.

The church's design was drawn up by Leo Tolstoy's grandson, architect Vladimir Tolstoy, gratuitously, of course. In the same voluntary manner the religious people of the town built the church, plastered the walls, gilded the dome and created the interior. It couldn't be otherwise due to the lack of money. In the autumn of 1957 the Church of the Protective Veil of the Holy Virgin, the child of the townsfolk's enthusiasm, was inaugurated. According to the prior, the parish has doubled since then.

In 1979, two Russian families donated $200,000 and two plots of land to the church. As a result, the expansions were made, including a Sunday school for children, a spacious auditorium and a Russian library. My conversation with Father Georgy took place in this library accented with a large portrait of Pushkin. The tradition of rendering gratuitous support to the church and the town cultural centre lasts to this day. I saw men painting walls in the adjacent room and women planting flowers under the windows.

So who are they, these Nayack Russians? Father Georgy says he is the one who knows the parishioners, about 200 adults and 80 schoolchildren, best. As a rule, they are rather well off people known as the "middle class" in America. The poor are rare in this locality.

Russians are employed in banks and offices, there are engineers, artisans and entrepreneurs who own small shops. Most of the local Russians are sons and grandsons of those who belonged to the first-wave emigration, but there are also those who were brought here by WWII. In the recent years, the parish was replenished by new arrivals from the former Soviet Union, Russians and Jews baptized into the Orthodox faith. The Russian nobility has its representatives in town, such well-known names as Tolstoys, Chertkovs, Lopukhins, Rodzyankos. A relative of the last tsar's family, Princess Vera Konstantinovna Romanova, lives at the Tolstoy Farm a short distance from the town.

At 9 a.m. every Sunday, 80 boys and girls fill the class rooms of the Nayack church school. Volunteers teach them the Russian language, the history of Russia and religion. The purpose is to preserve the language, culture and the feeling of unity with Russia in the descendants of Russian emigrants. Father Georgy is upset, if not offended, by hasty attempts of some people who found themselves outside their motherland to throw away their forefathers' culture as something unnecessary and unbecoming. He says: "Millions of people left Russia after the 1917 revolution, but very few remained Russians, they are primarily those who didn't abandon the faith and the Church. Of course, one can understand the rest, 'foreigners,' who make up 90 percent of emigrants – it doesn't pay to remain Russian living abroad, it's difficult and burdensome. And he who is concerned with financial success and career making is still less willing to waste his time on such trifles."

As for Father Georgy, he spares no effort on preserving the Russian culture, although he has never lived in Russia. His Russian is perfect. When asked if he speaks English, Father Georgy's three-year-old grandson answered: "I'm not allowed to." This is actually the case, Father Georgy is convinced that his posterity will successfully master English at school, but in order to preserve their Russian, they must be properly "saturated" with it from their early years.

The Nayack Russians' social and spiritual life is focussed primarily on religion. Most of them observe the annual cycle of Orthodox services, fasts and sacred festive days. In addition, formal dinner parties, tea parties complete with blinies, dances and lectures are arranged in the building attached to the church. Young sportsmen train in the large gymnasium. The church is not only a place where one is baptized and gets married, it's also a quiet harbour of a sort – married couples come here to discuss their problems with Father Georgy. Evidently he knows the paths to his parishioners' hearts, because in our stormy age when every second family in America and Russia is struck by divorce, only five couples have divorced in Nayack over the last 20 years. According to my interlocutor, this is more likely to happen in mixed marriages.

Alexander Lakhtarnik, the first Russian emigrant who became an American policeman

"And where are the Russians?"

It's rumoured that in 1971 President Nixon requested his assistants to prepare a report on ethnic minority communities in the United States. The list submitted to him included 32 ethnic groups, from Chinese to Ukrainians, from Jews to those born in India and Africa. Only one community which as early as those days numbered from 1 to 2 million was missing. "And where are the Russians?" exclaimed the President. This episode was told me by a Nayack townsman, Pyotr Budzilovich, chairman of the American Russians' Congress. This organization emerged in 1973 as if in response to President Nixon's perplexion.

Pyotr Budzilovich, 65, born in Belorussia, arrived in America when he was still a youth. He lives a very dynamic life rich in events. I would call him a man with three faces. A professional engineer, he long abandoned this technical occupation and mastered such very obscure to me fields as marketing and public relations. This source of revenues allowed him to raise three daughters and one son, and all this is, so to speak, his first face. The second is politics. He is completely absorbed with the activities of his Congress uniting about 8,000 Russians in the country. He is one of the publishers of a bulletin magazine *The Russian-American Review* in the English language. When in Washington, he attends receptions in the US Congress and visits the State Department. While Father Georgy is the spiritual leader of Russian Nayak, Pyotr Budzilovich may be called the community's political leader. He also has a third face – he and his wife are volunteer teachers at the Russian Sunday school.

Budzilovich doesn't simply teach history, he has written and published an overview of Russian history in three volumes. The first starts with the story of ancient Slavonic tribes and the last digs into the roots of Marxism.

Russians created their own organization for the defence of their interests much later than other ethnic minorities in America. The leaders of

the Congress of American Russians started out rather aggressively. For a long time their main objective was to teach American journalists and pooliticians the difference between the notions of "Russian" and "Soviet." Budzilovich and his followers were filled with indignation at such expressions used in the American press as "Russian communism, "communist Russia," "Russian imperialism." The Congress published a lot of articles and declarations proving that Soviet communist outrages had nothing to do with the Russian people. These protests seemed to produce the desired effect.

To assert Russian spiritual values and the contributions Russians have made to world culture, the Congress of American Russians founded the Chamber of Glory to which the most distinguished compatriots are elected from time to time as a sign of honour. The first among them was the inventor of television Vladimir Zvorykin. Nobel Prize winner Alexandra Tolstaya, economist Vassili Leontieff and others were among future honoured Russians. By affirming the uninvolvement of the Russian people in communist crimes, the Congress succeeded in changing the formula defining the enslaved nations which was adopted by the US Congress in 1959. Its new version described the nations inhabiting the territory of the present CIS not as "enslaved by Russian communism," but as enslaved by "Leninism and Soviet communism."

Now the Congress of American Russians has passed from slogans and actions of protest to positive ones. It calls upon American Russians to help their compatriots in Russia. The members of this organization not only sent containers with foodstuffs and clothes there, they have suggested that local Russian businessmen share their business experience with their Russian colleagues. We read in the April issue of their bulletin: "Now our assistance is most needed there, because inexperienced Russian businessmen strike bargains reminiscent of the times when Europeans exchanged beads and nails for jewels with savages."

What does the local public think of the political situation in the former Soviet Union? Like many other Nayack residents, Pyotr Budzilovich has visited this part of the world. He liked there only what had been built or created in the pre-revolutionary period. Everything new, Soviet, disgusted him. He also came to the conclusion that no common national idea persisted in Russia. "Under the Soviet regime, there was at least the idea of the building of socialism," he says. "Under the Tsar, the Orthodox faith and the preservation and expansion of the Empire were the dominant ideas. Nothing is left there now. A void." The Nayack Russians see no sense in establishing joint Russian-American companies. They believe that as yet the Russian side is unable to seriously conduct business on the Western level. In all likelihood, the West will plunder them.

Several of my interlocutors have confirmed this idea. Having lived in Europe and America for decades, these successful businessmen are convinced that the West views present Russia exclusively as a source of natural resources, as a country easy to exploit. Father Georgy proceeds even further in his reasoning. He believes that the West is going to enslave Russia and turn her into something like South America. The United States, Japan and West European countries will pump out Russian oil, excavate for gold, and will make the country a dump of radioactive waste. I did come across less gloomy forecasts, but on the whole, the elder generation of Russian emigrants seem more apprehensive of the American and West European democratic systems than the generation of the "third wave."

In the course of our conversation with Pyotr Budzilovich I cautiously inquired why, in his opinion, no one among American Russians had ever tried to participate in American political life during the 200 years of living in this country. Why isn't the million- (or more) strong Russian community till today represented in the Congress? There are Ukrainians, Poles, Lithuanians, Jews, even a Japanese there, but not a single Russian. There are outstanding engineers and musicians (Sikorsky and Rakhmaninoff), writers and painters (Nabokov and Kandinsky) among Russian emigrants, but there are no politicians. The Nayacker didn't agree with my thesis. Yet when I asked him if the Congress of American Russians was going to start a campaign to nominate a Russian as a candidate to the Legislative Assembly, he said that his organization had no right to do anything of the kind...

Well, so much for high politics. Russian residents of the United States have a much more practical and urgent task, that of aiding those, as a rule young and educated Russian people who arive in America as visitors, but with the secret hope to find a job corresponding with their skills and abilities here. There are already dozens of thousands of such people in the country.

More than one million Russians in America could probably organize something like a hotel and an employment agency. And, of course, they should raise in Washington the question of the fate of Russian emigrants. Yes, this is politics, yet this is successfully practiced by representatives of other national minorities in the United States.

I liked the outspokenness displayed by my Nayack interlocutors in discussing their political views, plans and prospects. However, I can't help concluding our political discussion with an impressive quotation: "According to American statistics, there are over two million Russians in the USA! If we all unite, Russians will be able, for the first time in the history of Russian emigration, to express their opinion which powers-that-be would have to take into account." This was written in an article published by the magazine *The Russian American* ten years ago. A nice idea. But nothing ensued...

Mark Popovsky

NAYACK–NEW YORK

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■ Predominance of national motifs in ornaments

■ complex application of colour, shape, diamond facets

■ application of various types of treatment (including dead etching, dent, grinding, special technique)

The company offers various forms of cooperation:

- ♦ setting up joint ventures;
- ♦ import-export activity;
- ♦ barter deals;
- ♦ investment joint activity.

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